


































IS U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
DANIEL SCHWARCZ * 
Abstract: Insurance regulation is ostensibly the primary domain of 
the states. In practice, however, the most important and powerful entity in 
insurance regulation is not a state at all, but a non-profit corporation known 
as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, or NAIC. Much of 
the NAIC’s power lies in its production of various “handbooks” and 
“manuals” that have the force of law because they are incorporated by 
reference in state insurance codes. Under this statutory scheme, when the 
NAIC updates or changes its various manuals, handbooks, or accounting 
forms, it also changes state insurance regulation. Because the NAIC is a 
private entity, it produces these various materials that have the force of law 
without being bound by any safeguards that ordinarily accompany the 
production of regulation, whether at the state or federal level. Moreover, the 
NAIC uses its unique accreditation program to directly pressure state 
legislatures to delegate this authority to it. This Article argues that this 
scheme violates basic separation of powers and non-delegation principles 
embedded in every state Constitution. Under any reasonable version of these 
principles, the delegation of state regulatory authority to a private entity that 
directly pressures legislatures to make this delegation and whose actions are 
not reviewable through any formal judicial or administrative process is 
unconstitutional. Recognizing this conclusion has the potential to improve 
state insurance regulation by increasing the accountability of state regulators 
and the NAIC. But it also carries the risk of undermining state insurance 
regulation by frustrating efforts to promote uniform national standards. 
However, this Article suggests that state legislatures can enact reforms that 
simultaneously remedy the unconstitutional structure of state insurance 
regulation while preserving the many practical benefits that flow from 
delegating production of regulatory standards to a single, national entity like 
the NAIC. In particular, they can establish an entity through an interstate 
compact that is truly independent from state insurance regulators and that is 
empowered to review the NAIC’s production of regulatory materials that 
have the force of law. 
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Insurance regulation is ostensibly the primary domain of the states.1 
In practice, however, the most important and powerful entity in insurance 
regulation is, without question, not a state at all. Nor is it even a government 
entity. Instead, it is a private, non-profit corporation known as the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, or NAIC.2 
In many contexts, the NAIC’s role in state insurance regulation is 
uncontroversial. For instance, the NAIC produces model insurance statutes 
and regulations. Much like any other model law project,3 states sometimes 
adopt these models wholesale, sometimes choose not to adopt them, and 
sometimes adopt them with significant changes.4 The NAIC also affords 
state insurance regulators an opportunity to collaborate with one another, 
provides both regulators and consumers with an array of services, and 
conducts various public information campaigns.5 
But the NAIC’s true power lies in its direct production of insurance 
regulatory materials that have the force of law, a category that includes over 
a dozen “handbooks” and “manuals.”6 These materials dictate (among many 
                                                 
1 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012)). 
2 See generally KENNETH ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE 
LAW AND REGULATION (6th ed. 2015); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation 
in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999).  
3 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final 
Draft No. 2, 2018). 
4 All model laws and regulations are available at NAIC Model Laws, 
Regulations, and Guidelines, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, 
http://www.naic.org/store_model_laws.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2018). For 
each model, the NAIC maintains an up-to-date list indicating which 
jurisdictions have enacted that model or a substantially similar version. 
5 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 111-13. 
6 Examples include the (1) Accounting Practices and Procedures 
Manual, (2) Annual Statement Blank, (3) Annual Statement Instructions, (4) 
Financial Analysis Handbook, (5) Financial Condition Examiner’s 
Handbook, (6) Insurance Regulatory Information System Ratio Manual, (7) 
NAIC Uniform Life, Accident and Health, Annuity and Credit Product 
Coding Matrix, (8) Own Risk and Solvency Assessment Guidance Manual, 
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other things) the information that insurers and other regulated entities must 
regularly report to regulators, the methodologies they must use to determine 
their capital levels, and the accounting standards that they must employ to 
calculate their assets and liabilities. They also constrain the work of 
regulators, in addition to regulated entities, dictating the methodologies they 
must use when conducting financial and market conduct exams.7 
These documents have the force of law because virtually every 
state’s insurance laws say they do.8 More specifically, the insurance codes 
of virtually every state requires insurers and state regulators to adhere to the 
rules that are detailed in the most recent versions of these NAIC materials.9 
As a result, when the NAIC updates or changes any of its various manuals, 
handbooks, or accounting forms, it also changes state insurance regulation—
without further action by the democratically accountable representatives of 
the states. This practice is one particularly troubling type of a more general 
statutory drafting practice known as dynamic incorporation by reference.10 
                                                 
(9) Purposes and Procedures Manual of the NAIC Investment Analysis 
Office, (10) Risk Based Capital Forecasting and Instructions, and (11) 
Securities Valuation Manual. See S. 341, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Ind. 2018), 2018 Ind. Acts 1167, http://iga.in.gov/static-
documents/2/3/f/b/23fbf999/SB0341.04.ENRH.pdf (compiling these). 
7 Examples of such manuals include: NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 
FINANCIAL CONDITION EXAMINERS HANDBOOK, and NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS, MARKET REGULATION HANDBOOK EXAMINATION STANDARDS. 
8 One partial exception is Indiana. See id. Indiana’s Senate Enrolled Act 
No. 341 changes all statutory references to NAIC materials so that they refer 
to the 2017 edition of those materials. At the same time, however, the 
legislation specifies that the “commissioner may implement” materials 
updated by the NAIC “in the regulation of the business of insurance” so long 
as the commissioner reports the amendment to the legislative council and 
standing committees. See id. ch. 1.5, § 1(c). 
9 See, e.g., 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2602 (West 
2018). Some state statutes do not explicitly reference the most recent 
versions of NAIC documents. But even in these cases, regulators require 
insurers to comply with the most recent versions of NAIC materials. 
10 See Jim Rossi, Dynamic Incorporation of Federal Law, 77 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 457 (2016). See also John Mark Keyes, Incorporation by Reference in 
Legislation, 25 STATUTE L. REV. 180 (2004) (distinguishing among four 
different types of text that can be incorporated by reference, as well as 
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Because the NAIC is a private entity, it produces these various 
materials that have the force of law without being bound by any of the 
procedural safeguards that ordinarily accompany the production of 
regulation, whether at the state or federal level.11 For instance, the NAIC is 
not required by any law to provide the public with notice and an opportunity 
to comment on these materials before they are adopted, though it generally 
does so voluntarily. It also need not disclose information that would be 
publicly-accessible if held by a public entity. And nothing that the NAIC 
produces is subject to judicial review or routine oversight by an 
administrative body.12 
Even more gallingly, while the NAIC’s power to directly set many 
of the details of state insurance regulation is itself a function of state law, in 
many cases state lawmakers are effectively compelled by the NAIC itself to 
delegate this authority to the private entity. The NAIC manages this 
staggering feat through its Financial Standards and Accreditation Program. 
Under this program, states can only be accredited if they adopt a set of NAIC 
model laws, or their substantial equivalent.13 And it is those very laws that 
incorporate by reference NAIC manuals and handbooks. 
Although the NAIC cannot mandate that states participate in its 
accreditation program, it has cleverly designed the program so that states 
effectively have no choice on the matter. That is why every single state is 
accredited. The NAIC accomplishes this by including a seemingly innocuous 
provision in the model laws that states must adopt to be accredited: 
accredited state insurance departments are only permitted to defer to the 
solvency regulation of an insurer’s home state (i.e. its state of domestication) 
                                                 
between incorporations by reference that are “static” (fixed in time) and 
“ambulatory” (linked to the most recent versions of the incorporated text)). 
11 State administrative law is variable. However, it generally follows 
many of the basic principles of federal administrative law with respect to the 
availability of judicial review and the requirements for agencies to provide 
the public with notice and an opportunity to comment on a range of 
administrative actions.  
12 State administrative law is variable. However, it generally follows 
many of the basic principles of federal administrative law with respect to the 
availability of judicial review and the requirements for agencies to provide 
the public with notice and an opportunity to comment on a range of 
administrative actions.  
13 See infra Section I.B. 
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if the home state is itself accredited.14 As a result, any insurer domesticated 
in a state that lost its accreditation would quickly “redomesticate” to another 
state.15 Failing to do so would subject it to financial scrutiny in every state 
where it sold coverage. Such redomestication requires moving the insurer’s 
principal place of business, as well as the taxes and jobs that come along with 
it.16 In a real sense, then, the NAIC – a private entity subject to none of the 
normal safeguards that ordinarily constrain the administrative state – has 
developed a complex system that effectively compels states to delegate to it 
the authority to produce many of the key details of state insurance regulation 
as it sees fit. 
This scheme, I argue, violates basic separation of powers and non-
delegation principles embedded in every state constitution. Although state 
constitutions vary, they all vest in a legislative branch the power to make 
laws, and they all are understood to limit the legislature’s power to delegate 
this authority elsewhere.17 Under any reasonable version of this principle, I 
argue, the delegation of state regulatory authority to a private entity that 
directly pressures legislatures to make this delegation and whose actions are 
not reviewable through any formal judicial or administrative process is 
unconstitutional. The Article is the first in-depth analysis of these 
                                                 
14 See MODEL LAW ON EXAMINATIONS § 3(C) (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS 1999) (“In lieu of an examination under this Act of a foreign or 
alien insurer licensed in this state, the commissioner may accept an 
examination report on the company as prepared by the insurance department 
for the company’s state of domicile…only if…the insurance department was 
at the time of the examination accredited under the NAIC’s Financial 
Regulation Standards and Accreditation Program….”). 
15 See infra Section I.B. 
16 See REDOMESTICATION MODEL BILL § 1 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS 2006) (“An insurer that is organized under the laws of any other 
state and is admitted to do business in this state for the purpose of writing 
insurance may become a domestic insurer by…and by designating its 
principal place of business at a place in this state.”); MODEL LAW ON 
EXAMINATIONS (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 1999) (noting that virtually 
every single state has adopted the NAIC Redomestication Model Law, and 
the small handful that have not have “related activity”.). 
17 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS (2009). 
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constitutional issues, notwithstanding the fact that several prominent former 
and current officials have alluded to this issue for decades.18 
The Article’s argument unfolds in four Parts. Part I begins by briefly 
introducing the NAIC’s governance structure, funding model, and 
                                                 
18 Dating as far back as 1991, Roy Woodall – the former independent 
member of the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel with Insurance 
Expertise – warned that “national regulation of insurance is the culmination 
of a state supported regulatory scheme whereby a select few insurance 
regulators are able to engineer methods by which the NAIC can usurp 
legislative and judicial powers of the states by expending existing NAIC 
regulatory vehicles to impose illegal and unconstitutional regulatory 
jurisdiction and requirements upon the insurance industry in all fifty states – 
without the benefits of any state or federal oversight or legislative action.” 
S. Roy Woodall, Jr., The NAIC and “National Regulation,” Editorial, 
National Association of Life Companies Newsletter (1991). More recently, 
Congressman Ed Royce has suggested during oral comments in several 
congressional hearings that the NAIC has usurped state authority by making 
regulatory policy without any effective oversight by the states or other public 
actors. See Allison Bell, Republican Questions Constitutionality of 
Insurance Regulatory System, THINKADVISOR (Oct. 25, 2017, 06:29 AM), 
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2017/10/25/republican-questions-constitutio 
nality-of-insuranc/?slreturn=20190009212135. Yet a third example of 
prominent former or current officials questioning the constitutionality of the 
NAIC’s authority comes from former Illinois Insurance Commissioner Nat 
Shapo. In oral testimony before a committee of Indiana lawmakers, Shapo 
argued that “Dynamic incorporation by reference—implementing material 
added to [incorporated by referenced] work product after State’s adoption of 
work product through [Incorporation by Reference]—[is] not allowed” 
under “state constitutional law” and the non-delegation doctrine. See 
Testimony of Nat Shapo, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, before August 16, 
2017: Interim Study Committee on Financial Institutions and Insurance. This 
issue has also been a frequent topic of conversation at meetings of the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislatures. See Ian Adams, At NCOIL, 
State Lawmakers Look to Claw Back Power from NAIC, INS. J., (March 6, 
2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/right-street/2017/03/06/443 
636.htm; Ian Adams, NCOIL, NAIC on Collision Course over 
Delegation Authority, INS. J., (July 15, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal 
.com/blogs/right-street/2017/07/15/457728.htm). 
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accreditation program. It then explores how states delegate power to the 
NAIC by incorporating-by-reference the most recent versions of the NAIC’s 
materials. It focuses attention on three notable examples of such dynamic 
incorporation by reference. The first concerns life insurers’ calculation and 
reporting of their reserves, which determine the capital they must set aside 
to pay future policyholder claims. Second, Part I describes how the NAIC 
directs insurers’ methods and documentation of their corporate risk 
management practices. Third, Part I explores how states delegate to the 
NAIC the power to set the accounting rules that govern insurers’ copious 
financial reporting obligations. 
Part II lays the Article’s legal foundation by describing state law 
regarding legislative delegations of power to private entities. Although this 
law varies across jurisdictions, virtually every state tolerates legislative 
delegation of power to private parties only in limited circumstances. States 
generally avoid any bright-line rules on this issue, instead utilizing a variety 
of overlapping multi-factor tests. Relevant factors include the public or 
private character of the delegate, the extent to which the delegate’s authority 
is subject to judicial or administrative oversight, and whether the delegate’s 
exercise of authority has significance independent of the delegating statute. 
Part II explores how these factors play out in two situations that closely 
parallel states’ delegation of power to the NAIC: dynamic incorporation by 
reference of the American Medical Association’s impairment standards in 
state workers’ compensation laws, and state and federal delegations of 
authority to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to set 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  
Drawing on Parts I and II, Part III explains why states’ delegation of 
power to the NAIC violates essential separation of powers and due process 
principles embedded in every state constitution. First, Part III argues that the 
NAIC is a private entity for purposes of states’ non-delegation doctrines. 
Under the formalistic approach to this issue that some courts employ, this 
conclusion flows naturally from the fact that the NAIC is chartered as a 
Delaware corporation founded by state regulators, rather than state 
legislatures.19 But even under the functional approach embraced by other 
courts, the NAIC is a private delegate. This is because state legislatures have 
limited and fragmented control over the NAIC, a reality that is perhaps best 
illustrated by the inability of states legislatures to date to successfully reclaim 
their constitutional authority from the NAIC.  
The NAIC’s law-making authority is constitutionally problematic 
for a second set of reasons as well: it is exempt from dedicated and 
                                                 
19 See infra Section III. 
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independent oversight by state judges or administrate bodies. In fact, none 
of the NAIC’s alterations to its dynamically-incorporated manuals are 
routinely reviewed by any state court or administrative agency.20 State 
insurance regulators’ direct participation in the NAIC’s internal processes is 
no substitute for such independent oversight. To the contrary, state insurance 
regulators operating under the auspices of the NAIC may have substantial 
interests in using the NAIC’s delegated authority in ways that promote their 
own biased interests. For instance, state insurance regulators may use the 
NAIC’s authority to inflate the scope and complexity of the special 
accounting principles that U.S. insurers are required to use.21 Doing so can 
increase the value of regulators’ specialized insurance expertise, limit the 
risk of perceived encroachment on their turf by federal officials, and improve 
the NAIC’s capacity to fund its operations by selling new publications or 
services. Alternatively, state regulators can, and do, use the NAIC to raise, 
pursue, and implement difficult policies in a private forum, away from 
democratic accountability.22 
To be sure, state statutes do contain provisions allowing state 
regulators to depart from dynamically incorporated materials, the most 
important factor suggesting that the NAIC’s scheme may be constitutional. 
But such departures are not routinely or formally considered by state 
insurance departments. Nor could they be, given the relative scope of the 
NAIC’s power and the limited resources of most state insurance 
departments. Even in the rare instances when an individual state insurance 
department departs from a specific NAIC-produced standard, it is in no 
position to use this action to influence the NAIC’s operations more broadly.23 
The final, and perhaps most important, reason that states’ 
delegations of powers to the NAIC are generally unconstitutional is that the 
NAIC’s exercise of its delegated authority is practically immune from 
implicit oversight by state legislatures. This is a result of the NAIC’s unique 
Financial Standards and Accreditation Program, which deprives state 
lawmakers of any realistic capacity to claw-back their delegations of power 
to the NAIC by amending state law.24 As a practical matter, the NAIC uses 
the threat of doom of a state’s domestic insurance industry to compel states 
                                                 
20 See infra Section I. 
21 See infra Section III. 
22 See infra Section III. 
23 See infra Section III. 
24 See infra Section I. 
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to delegate to it immense power over both the details of insurance regulation 
and the larger framework within which those details are generated. 
Part IV of the Article considers the implications of the conclusion 
that much of state insurance regulation rests on an unconstitutional 
foundation. It first explores both the positive and negative impacts of simply 
eliminating state delegations of power to the NAIC. Although this approach 
would increase accountability and decrease bias in the production of state 
insurance regulation, it would also undermine the uniformity and agility of 
such regulation. For this reason, Part IV concludes by suggesting that states 
can constitutionally preserve their delegations of power to the NAIC by 
creating, through an interstate compact, an independent entity responsible 
for reviewing the production of new NAIC materials that have the force of 
law. 
I.  STATE DELEGATION OF POWER TO THE NAIC 
The NAIC is, in many ways, a unique entity in the American 
regulatory landscape. To be sure, as a private organization of public officials, 
it resembles any number of other groups, such as the Association of State 
and Territorial Health Officials or the Association of State Criminal 
Investigative Agencies.25 But unlike any other private association of public 
officials, the NAIC is directly responsible for producing many of the 
essential details of state regulation. Section A of this Part briefly describes 
the NAIC’s history and structure. Section B then describes the NAIC’s 
unusual “accreditation” program, which is directly responsible for the 
organization’s unique regulatory authority under state law. Section C then 
explores three notable state delegations of authority to the NAIC, involving 
life insurers’ calculation and reporting of their reserves, insurers’ corporate 
risk management practices and reporting, and insurers’ accounting rules. 
A.   OVERVIEW OF THE NAIC 
The NAIC describes itself as “the U.S. standard-setting and 
regulatory support organization created and governed by the chief insurance 
regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. 
                                                 
25 About, ASS’N OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, 
http://www.astho.org/About/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018); About, ASS’N OF 
STATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES, https://www.ascia.org/about. 
php (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 
2018 IS U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION 207 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
 
territories.”26 A group of state insurance commissioners created the 
organization in 1871 as an unincorporated association.27 At the time, the 
NAIC was focused on facilitating states’ efforts to regulate multistate 
insurers by developing a uniform system of financial reporting for these 
companies.28 But throughout the twentieth century, the NAIC’s importance 
in state insurance regulation gradually increased, with the organization 
taking on an increasingly prominent role in crafting model laws and 
regulations for states to implement and operating as a forum for dialogue 
among state regulators and the insurance industry.29 
As the NAIC’s role increased, so did its staff and budget. Run on a 
shoestring with a small staff as recently as the 1980s, today the NAIC has 
approximately 500 employees spread out over offices in Washington, D.C., 
New York, and Kansas City.30 This staff is supported by a budget of over 
$100 million as well as a reserve of an additional $100 million.31  
The NAIC sets its own budget without any external oversight. Much 
of the NAIC’s revenue comes from its sale of data, reports, and publications 
                                                 
26 About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, 
https://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
27 This was shortly after the Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia that 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce did not extend to the 
business of insurance. 75 U.S. 168 (1868). 
28 KENNETH MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE 
CASE OF INSURANCE 54 (1988). 
29 See Randall, supra note 2, at 648. One watershed moment in the 
NAIC’s evolution was its rile in coordinating states’ response to United 
States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, which overruled Paul v Virginia by 
holding that the deferral government could indeed regulate the business of 
insurance under its Commerce Clause power. 322 U.S. 533 (1994). The case 
generated substantial concern among states worried about federal 
encroachment on the regulation and taxation of insurance as well as among 
insurers concerns about a new source of federal scrutiny. The NAIC 
ultimately played a major role in proposing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
which cemented the states’ authority to regulate the business of insurance 
and remains the central law in U.S. regulations. 
30 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2018 NAIC BUDGET 25 (2018), 
https://www.naic.org/documents/about_budget_2018_budget.pdf?13; 
About the NAIC, supra note 15. 
31 See supra note 19. 
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to the insurance industry. For instance, the NAIC’s leading source of revenue 
is its provision of valuation services, which instruct insurers how to value 
their investments for regulatory reporting purposes.32 Other major 
contributors to the NAIC’s budget include the sale of publications and 
insurance data products, transaction filing fees, and its administrative 
services and license fees, all of which ultimately come out of the pocket of 
insurance industry members.33 Although state insurance regulators cannot 
compel insurers to pay these NAIC fees, they can informally pressure 
carriers to do so by threatening negative treatment of noncompliant carriers. 
Among the publications that the NAIC sells to the industry are the very 
manuals that are dynamically incorporated by reference into state law.34 
                                                 
32 The NAIC charges the largest subset of individual carriers $36,000 
annually for full access to this database, and ultimately earns approximately 
$26 million annually in connection with this service. The NAIC earns a 
roughly similar amount annually from the fees that it charges to insurers for 
filing their required quarterly and annual statements with the NAIC’s central 
data collection system. This includes NAIC designation and review date, 
pricing, SIC code, SVO group code, and market indicator. NAT’L ASS’N OF 
INS. COMM’RS, Supra note 19, at 2. 
33 Id. Although the NAIC does charge its individual members – who 
consist of the fifty-six state insurance commissioners – an assessment fee, 
total revenue from this source only comes in at about 2% of the NAIC’s 
annual budget. See id.  
34 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standard in Public Law: 
Copyright, Lawmaking, and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 
(2005) (considering whether such materials are entitled to copyright). The 
NAIC also derives approximately a quarter of its budget from various vendor 
service units. Both directly and through its controlled corporate affiliate 
NIPR, the NAIC collects over $25 million annually from its business units 
which sell their services to the public offices of the same insurance 
commissioners who are its members and who are the beneficiaries of 
significant largesse from the NAIC’s expenditure of its $100 million budget. 
This includes annual commissioner-only junkets to resorts in tropical 
locations like the Virgin Islands every February, and prime domestic 
locations like Laguna Beach and Coeur d’Alene every July. The NAIC, 
capitalizing on state budget crunches in the last 20 years, has formed several 
vendors that serve as a portal for almost all agent and broker licensing 
transactions, most rate and form filings, billions in premium tax payments, 
and various other regulatory functions. The NAIC explicitly competes with 
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Since 1999, the NAIC has been organized as a non-profit 
corporation that is governed by an Executive Committee consisting of 
seventeen state insurance commissioners. This Executive Committee is 
elected by the NAIC’s membership, which consists of the chief state 
government official in charge of regulating the business of insurance in each 
state, as well as six additional U.S. jurisdictions.35 The NAIC’s day-to-day 
operations are directed by its Chief Executive Officer and senior 
management, who are hired and overseen by the Executive Committee.  
As a private non-profit corporation, the NAIC is not subject to any 
state or federal government accountability laws, such as Freedom of 
Information Acts, Sunshine Acts, Inspectors General requirements, or state 
Conflict of Interest rules.36 However, the NAIC does maintain a number of 
self-imposed policies and practices that overlap with the typical content of 
these laws. For instance, all NAIC members are required to sign a conflict-
                                                 
private vendors for the no-bid contracts that it receives from its members, 
and in fact was forced to pay a $1.5 million settlement to a vendor which 
accused it of predatory behavior, including price fixing. Trade press and a 
key Congressman have argued that these activities violate a host of state 
ethics laws, but without a day-to-day supervisor and without any 
investigative reporters assigned to the NAIC beat, no efforts at accountability 
have been made.  
35 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (2015). 
36 For one example of how this plays out, consider the industry-aggregate 
data that the NAIC’s Auto Insurance Study Group recently collected in 
connection with its charge to study auto insurance affordability and 
availability. The NAIC has refused to make this data publicly available, even 
though it is similar to data reported by the statistical agents to state insurance 
regulators, which is publicly available. See Comments of CFA and CEJ to 
Auto Insurance Working Group Regarding the August 10, 2018 Draft 
“Report” Outline (Sept. 1, 2018)(on file with the CEJ) (“By providing the 
data to the NAIC instead of the states, somehow clearly public information 
has, inappropriately, become confidential information because the NAIC – 
despite its quasi-governmental role – is not subject to any state or federal 
public information law. The NAIC’s refusal to make public the data 
submitted by industry adds fuel to the complaint that the NAIC is 
unaccountable to legislators and consumers who are impacted by NAIC 
actions.”).  
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of-interest policy that requires them to “avoid any activity or situation where 
their personal interest could conflict, or give the appearance of a conflict, 
with the business operations or regulatory support activities of the NAIC.”37  
The NAIC organizes much of its activity through an elaborate series 
of committees and sub-committees. These committees are typically staffed 
by a group of volunteer state insurance regulators, who are heavily supported 
by NAIC staff.38 All changes to model laws and regulations are conducted 
through this committee structure.39 Changes to the statutorily-referenced 
materials, such as handbooks and guides, are also conducted through the 
NAIC’s committee structure, with different committees being charged with 
maintaining and updating different documents.40 
Industry has substantial sway over the NAIC’s operations and 
practices, a fact that is most obviously visible at the organization’s three 
annual meetings. Under the NAIC’s open meeting policy, almost all of the 
organization’s meetings – both in person and via teleconference – are open 
                                                 
37 Although the policy extends to promised offers of future employment, 
it is commonplace for NAIC members to take high-profile industry lobbying 
positions shortly after being members of NAIC leadership. In at least some 
of these cases, individuals have represented the industry in front of the same 
committees that they chaired as an NAIC officer only months earlier. See, 
e.g., Csiszar Named President of PCI; Resigns as S.C. Insurance Regulator, 
President of NAIC, INS. J. (Aug. 18, 2004), https://www.insurancejournal.co 
m/news/national/2004/08/18/45061.htm. 
38 See Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer 
Empowerment Programs, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 365, 365-96 (David A Moss & 
Daniel Carpenter eds., 2013). 
39 In 2007, the NAIC adopted an internal procedure for model law 
development, which requires that a parent committee and the NAIC’s 
Executive Committee approve development of the model, as well as the final 
version of the model, by two-thirds majority vote. See PROCEDURES FOR 
MODEL LAW DEV. (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2013). (2007), https:// 
www.naic.org/documents/committees_models_procedures.pdf. 
40 See, e.g., Statutory Accounting Principles (E) Working Group, NAT’L 
ASS’N INS. COMM'RS, https://www.naic.org/cmte_e_app_sapwg.htm (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2019) (“The Statutory Accounting Principles (E) Working 
Group is responsible for developing and adopting substantive, 
nonsubstantive and interpretation revisions to the NAIC Accounting 
Practices and Procedures Manual (AP&P Manual”)) (emphasis in original). 
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to the industry and other members of the public.41 A typical in-person 
committee meeting might consist of around 20 committee members seated 
at the front of the room, with approximately 200 spectators in the audience, 
almost all of whom are representing the industry in some fashion. The NAIC 
derives meaningful revenue from industry participation in its annual 
meetings, amounting to approximately $3 million annually.42 Private parties 
routinely participate actively in committee meetings through the submission 
of oral and written comments and reports as well as through formal 
presentations. To help offset this industry influence, the NAIC operates a 
formal consumer participation program, which facilitates participation in its 
activities by approximately twenty designated consumer liaisons.43 
B.    THE NAIC’S FINANCIAL STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION 
PROGRAM 
Individual states need not adopt the NAIC’s model laws, and they 
often choose not to do so when it comes to NAIC models having nothing to 
do with financial regulation. However, states do indeed uniformly enact the 
subset of NAIC model laws that are required under the NAIC’s Financial 
Standards and Accreditation Program.44 This program certifies that 
individual state departments’ solvency regulation meets minimum standards, 
which requires the department to have “adequate statutory and 
administrative authority.”45 For an insurance department to be deemed to 
have adequate legal authority under the program, its state must adopt the 
subset of NAIC model laws that are accreditation standards, or else they must 
adopt laws with “substantially similar provisions.”46 
                                                 
41 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, NAIC POLICY STATEMENT 
ON OPEN MEETINGS (2014), https://www.naic.org/documents/meetings_nai 
c_policy_mtg_801.pdf. However, the NAIC reserves the right to hold closed 
meetings on a regulator-to-regulator basis for a broad variety of reasons. Id. 
42 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 30. 
43 See Schwarcz, supra note 38. 
44 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2.  
45 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, FINANCIAL REGULATION 
STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION PROGRAM 1, 1–17 (2018), https://www. 
naic.org/documents/cmte_f_frsa_pamphlet.pdf [hereinafter “NAIC 
Accreditation Standards”]. 
46 Id. at 9. 
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States face little practical choice but to adopt the NAIC accreditation 
standards because failing to do so would result in a substantial reduction in 
their tax revenue and jobs. Within the various model laws that states must 
adopt under the accreditation program are provisions allowing state 
insurance departments to defer to the solvency regulation of an insurer’s state 
of domestication,47 but only if that state’s insurance department is accredited. 
As a result, insurers operating in multiple states will predictably shift their 
state of domestication out of a state that lost its NAIC accreditation, because 
failing to do so would result in it being subject to solvency-oriented scrutiny 
in every state where it sold coverage. To accomplish such a redomestication, 
insurers must generally re-designate their “principal place of business” to the 
new state of domestication.48 Consequently, a state that lost its NAIC 
accreditation would also lose the jobs and tax revenue associated with its 
domesticated insurers. State legislatures, of course, have strong reasons to 
avoid this outcome. 
One recent presentation to New Mexico’s Legislative Council by the 
Chief General Counsel of the New Mexico insurance department is 
illustrative of the pressure the NAIC accreditation program places on state 
legislatures. In explaining why, the New Mexico legislature needed to 
promptly adopt the NAIC’s ORSA Model Law – a new accreditation 
standard – the presentation observes: 
The NAIC requires enactment of this bill in order for OSI [the Office 
of Superintendent of Insurance in New Mexico] to maintain its accreditation 
with the NAIC: If OSI loses its accreditation, New Mexico insurers that write 
in other states would have to undergo costly and disruptive examinations by 
the insurance departments of each state in which they write. This could cause 
insurers to leave New Mexico and to domicile in another state, resulting in 
the loss of jobs and tax revenues. Since all 50 states are currently accredited, 
New Mexico's loss of accreditation would be a national embarrassment and 
would lend support to efforts to shift insurance regulation to the federal 
government with a resulting loss in state control and revenues.49 
                                                 
47 Technically this is referred to as the insurer’s state of domicile, and it 
is analogous to a corporation’s state of incorporation.  
48 See NAIC, Redomestication Model Bill, Model 350.  
49 Vicente Vargas & Margaret Moquin, Presentation to the New Mexico 
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The immense pressure that the NAIC’s accreditation program places 
on states is intentional. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, state solvency 
regulation was subject to blistering criticism at the federal level due to 
several high-profile insurance insolvencies. A series of federal reports 
concluded that state insurance solvency regulation was “seriously 
deficient”50 and that the NAIC could not compel states to enact needed 
reforms.51 The NAIC’s accreditation program was directly designed to 
overcome these problems. It did so, of course, by effectively threatening to 
regulate into oblivion the insurers of any state that chose not to adhere to the 
NAIC’s new program. 
C.    STATE DELEGATIONS TO THE NAIC 
States delegate a tremendous amount of authority over insurance 
regulation to the NAIC due to their insurance codes’ incorporation by 
reference of the latest versions of NAIC materials. One recent count 
identified seventeen such NAIC-produced documents that were dynamically 
incorporated by reference in Indiana’s statutes.52 A substantial majority of 
these documents are required by the NAIC’s accreditation standards, 
meaning that they are dynamically incorporated by reference under the laws 
of every U.S. jurisdiction.53 Although the scope and significance of these 
NAIC-produced documents varies considerably, many are hundreds of pages 
long and control central elements of state insurance regulation. By way of 
example, this Section reviews three significant state delegations of authority 
to the NAIC, which govern insurers’ calculation and reporting of their 
                                                 
50 COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., REP ON 
INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES (Comm. Print 1990). 
51 GAO REPORT, INSURANCE REGULATION: ASSESSMENT OF THE 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (1991) (“For 
several reasons, GAO questions whether NAIC’s accreditation program can 
achieve its goal…. NAIC does not have the authority necessary to fulfill its 
assumed role as a national regulator. As a result, NAIC is unlikely to achieve 
its stated goal of establishing a national insurance regulatory system. It can 
neither compel state actions necessary for effective regulation nor, in the 
long run, can it sustain its reforms.”).  
52 See note 5, supra. 
53 See NAIC ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 30. 
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reserves, methods and documentation of corporate risk management, and 
accounting rules. 
1. Dynamic Incorporation by Reference of the NAIC’s 
Valuation Manual 
Perhaps the most significant state delegation of power to the NAIC 
stems from states’ dynamic incorporation-by-reference of the NAIC’s 
Valuation Manual. With a small handful of exceptions, the law of every state 
in the country includes language identical or substantially similar to the 
NAIC’s 2009 Model Standard Valuation Law (SVL), which dynamically 
incorporates by reference the NAIC’s Valuation Manual.54 The Valuation 
Manual, in turn, governs every facet of life insurers’ calculation and 
reporting of their “reserves.”55 
Rules governing life insurers’ reserve calculations are among the 
most important elements of state solvency regulation. Reserves correspond 
to the amount that insurers must “set aside” on their balance sheet in 
anticipation of future payouts to insurance policyholders.56 They operate as 
the foundation for many other core regulatory tools, the most important of 
which are capital requirements.57 Reserve calculations are particularly 
important for long-tail lines of coverage like life insurance, where there is 
typically a substantial time gap between when a policyholder pays premiums 
and when they potentially receive payment on their claims.58 If insurers are 
not forced to properly account for their obligations in the distant future, then 
they may well not be able to pay for those claims when they come due. 
The SVL model and the state statutes emulating it do contain some 
principles regarding the scope of the Valuation Manual and the process that 
the NAIC must follow to amend the manual. For instance, they indicate that 
the Valuation Manual should specify the format of reports, information, and 
data that insurers must submit to state regulators; the assumptions that 
insurers must use in their reserve modeling; and the procedures that insurers 
must maintain for corporate governance and oversight of the actuaries who 
                                                 
54 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STANDARD VALUATION LAW § 11 
(2010). 
55 Id. 
56 See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 121-22. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 292. 
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develop the reserve models.59 Additionally, state laws based on the NAIC 
model SVL provide that individual state commissioners can implement 
regulations requiring insurers to use procedures that depart from those 
contained in the model.60 They also provide that the NAIC can only amend 
the model via a super-majority vote of its fifty-six voting members.61  
The latest version of the NAIC’s Valuation Manual – last amended 
in August of 2017 – clocks in at 295 pages and includes detailed and 
extensive provisions on virtually every element of insurers’ reserve 
calculation. It is organized into five sections. The primary section details 
how insurers must calculate their reserves using projected asset and liability 
cash flows across a range of economic scenarios.62 These projections must 
incorporate insurers’ assumptions about factors such as policyholder 
mortality, policyholder behavior, and expenses. Insurers are also required by 
the Valuation Manual to calculate a minimum reserve amount, which is 
intended to prevent excessively low reserves. The other four sections of the 
Valuation Manual govern procedural and reporting requirements for 
insurers. For instance, they require insurers to submit to regulators actuarial 
opinions regarding the adequacy of reserves as well as reams of data 
regarding the carriers’ mortality, morbidity, policyholder behavior, and 
expense experience.63  
Almost every state passed the NAIC’s updated SVL model well 
before the NAIC published this latest version of its Valuation Manual, 
meaning that these states delegated authority to the NAIC which it actually 
                                                 
59 Standard Valuation Law § 11 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2010). 
In addition to life insurance contracts, the SVL also applies to annuity and 
pure endowment contracts, accident and health contracts, and deposit 
contracts issued on or after the operative date of the Valuation Manual. 
60 Id. The Commissioner is also authorized to require a company to 
change an assumption or method if the Commissioner determines it is not in 
compliance with the Act or the Valuation Manual. 
61 Memorandum from the Life Actuarial (A) Task Force, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Ins. Comm’rs, to the Fin. Regulation Standards and Accreditation (F) 
Comm., Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.naic.org/ 
documents/cmte_f_pbr_referal_2009_revisions_standard_valuation_law_8
20.pdf [hereinafter Task Force Memorandum]. 
62 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, VALUATION MANUAL (2018). 
63 Id. Under the Valuation Manual, the NAIC itself is the experience data 
collection agent. 
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used. In fact, many states passed the NAIC’s model SVL law between 2009, 
when it was finalized, and late 2012, when the NAIC published the first 
version of the Valuation Manual.64 States that passed the NAIC’s SVL model 
after the NAIC first published the Valuation Manual in 2012 but before the 
NAIC’s latest update of the manual in August 2017 – a category which 
includes almost all of the states that did not pass the model before late 201265 
– also delegated authority to the NAIC that it used extensively. Between 
2015 and 2017, the NAIC has adopted over fifty different amendments to the 
valuation manual at five different times.66  
                                                 
64 The NAIC model and corresponding state statutes allowed states to 
incorporate a then-undrafted Valuation Manual by providing that insurers’ 
reserve calculations would only be governed by the manual when two 
conditions were met. First, the NAIC model and the statutes on which it is 
based required a super-majority of the NAIC’s fifty-six voting members to 
approve the Valuation Manual. Second, it required a supermajority of U.S. 
insurance jurisdictions to adopt legislation implementing the SVL revisions. 
In June 2016, the NAIC certified that these conditions had been met. First, 
between 2009 and 2016, forty-five states, representing 79.5% of U.S. 
premium volume, had adopted the 2009 NAIC model revisions to their SVLs 
or legislation with substantially similar terms and provisions. Second, the 
NAIC formally adopted the first version of the Valuation Manual in 
December 2012, and subsequently adopted over fifty different amendments 
to the Valuation Manual at five different times between 2015 and 2017. As 
a result of these conditions being met, the Valuation Manual is now law in 
almost every U.S. state. Starting in 2017, a three-year trial phase of PBR – 
during which the Valuation Manual is optional for insurers – went into effect 
in all states that had passed the model legislation. The trial phase for 
implementation was established in the manual itself, rather than in the SVL 
revisions. At the start of 2020, PBR will become fully effective and the 
Valuation Manual will dictate insurers’ reserve practices in all states that 
have passed the model law. See Task Force Memorandum, supra note 42. 
65 Meanwhile, forty-five of the fifty-one jurisdictions that have adopted 
the NAIC’s SVL did so by the end of 2016, before the latest round of NAIC 
revisions to the Valuation Manual. Id. 
66 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, VALUATION MANUAL at i (2018), 
https://www.naic.org/documents/prod_serv_2018_valuation_manual.pdf 
(listing amendments through 2016: “The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) initially adopted the Valuation Manual on Dec. 2, 
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States have almost uniformly passed the NAIC’s model SVL law 
notwithstanding that the Valuation Manual that it incorporates into state law 
represents a fundamental change in the character of state solvency 
regulation. Historically, states required life insurers to use mechanical and 
relatively simple formulas to calculate their reserves. This approach, 
however, created a variety of complications due to the increasing 
heterogeneity and complexity of life insurers’ products.67 Starting shortly 
before the 2008 financial crisis, state regulators organizing through the 
NAIC responded to these concerns by launching a Principles-Based 
Reserving (PBR) initiative.68 The core idea of PBR was to replace the 
mechanical rules governing insurers’ reserve calculations with a system that 
allowed insurers to calculate their future obligations to policyholders based 
on internal, company-specific models. Rather than checking the accuracy of 
insurers’ mechanical calculations, state regulators in this regime would 
ensure that firms’ internal models complied with a range of broad principles, 
technical specifications, and procedural requirements. The SVL model and 
Valuation Manual implement this new PBR regime. 
States’ uniform passage of the NAIC SVL model is largely 
attributable to NAIC pressure via the accreditation program. Starting in early 
2010, an NAIC committee recommended including the 2009 revisions to the 
NAIC’s SVL model in the NAIC’s accreditation standards.69 After years of 
delay and debate, the NAIC ultimately adopted this suggestion in 2016, but 
delayed its implementation until January 2020.70 At present only five 
jurisdictions have not passed the latest version of the SVL law, and it is 
                                                 
2012, with subsequent adoptions of amendments on June 18, 2015; Nov. 22, 
1015 [sic]; April 6, 2016; Aug. 29, 2016; and Aug. 9, 2017.”). 
67 Robert F. Weber, Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance 
Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk Management Approach to 
Principles-Based Reserving, 8 BERKLEY BUS. L.J. 35, 105-15 (2011). 
68 This timing is notable. A similar principles-based approach to 
calculating capital requirements proved disastrous in the crisis, but by the 
time this became clear, the PBR initiative was already quite far along. See 
Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in 
Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569 (2014). 
69 See Task Force Memorandum, supra note 61. 
70 The National System of State Regulation and Principle-Based 
Reserving, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/principle_based_reserving_pbr.htm. 
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widely expected that these holdouts will succumb to NAIC pressure by 
2020.71 
NAIC staff have played a central role in the implementation of PBR 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. For instance, the NAIC 
maintains substantial actuarial staff to assist state regulators in reviewing 
individual companies’ reserve calculations and documentation. It created a 
standing Valuation Analysis (E) Working Group to serve as a “confidential 
forum regarding questions and issues arising during the course of annual 
principle-based reserving (PBR) reviews or PBR examination” and to refer 
issues that may require “consideration of changes/interpretations to be 
provided in the Valuation Manual.”72 
2. Dynamic Incorporation by Reference of the Own Risk 
and Solvency Assessment Manual 
State statutory references to the NAIC’s “Own Risk and Solvency 
Assessment Manual” (“ORSA Manual”) constitute a second type of state 
delegation of power to the NAIC. These statutory cross-references derive 
from the NAIC’s Risk Management and Own Risk Solvency Assessment 
Model Act (“ORSA Model Act”), which the NAIC formally adopted in 
2012.73 The Act specifies that changes made by the NAIC to the ORSA 
Manual are effective starting in the calendar year after adoption.74 Since the 
NAIC designated the Model Act as an accreditation standard, every single 
state (except one) has adopted the model or a statute with substantially 
similar language as of March 2018.75 
                                                 
71 As of today, fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions have passed these revisions; 
The five that have not are New York, Alaska, Massachusetts, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See Task Force Memorandum, supra note 61. 
72 Valuation Analysis (E) Working Group, 2018 Charges, NAT’L ASS’N 
INS. COMM’RS, https://www.naic.org/cmte_e_valuation_analysis_wg.htm 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
73 RISK MGMT. & OWN RISK & SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT MODEL ACT 
(NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2012). 
74 Id. § 2. 
75 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATE LEGISLATIVE BRIEF: THE 




2018 IS U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION 219 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
 
The ORSA Model Act requires large insurers to maintain an 
enterprise risk management framework based on the latest version of the 
NAIC’s ORSA Manual. Carriers subject to the Act must regularly assess 
their risk management framework “consistent with a process comparable to” 
the NAIC’s ORSA Manual.76 To document their compliance with the risk 
management processes outlined in the ORSA Manual, insurers covered by 
the Act are required to annually produce an ORSA summary report. The Act 
provides that this ORSA summary report – like the ORSA itself and the other 
required documentation – “shall be prepared consistent with the ORSA 
Guidance Manual.”77  
The ORSA Model Act does not provide the NAIC with any direction 
about the process or substance of the ORSA Manual. For instance, it does 
not contain any substantive guidance on how the NAIC should craft the 
standards within the ORSA Manual, aside from the implicit suggestion that 
the manual should cover appropriate risk management practices for insurers. 
Nor does the Model Act specify any procedure for the NAIC to follow in 
adopting or revising the manual. 
The NAIC adopted the latest version of its ORSA Manual in late 
2017.78 The manual contains a variety of directions to insurers regarding the 
content, procedures, and documentation of their required risk management 
practices. For instance, it specifies that insurers must assess and document 
their Risk Culture and Governance, Risk Identification and Prioritization, 
Risk Appetite, Tolerances and Limits, Risk Management and Controls, and 
Risk Reporting and Communication.79  
One of the most important elements of the manual requires insurers 
to report a “group risk capital assessment” in their ORSA summary report.80 
                                                 
76 Risk Management and Own Risk and Solvency Assessment Model 
Act § 4 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2012). 
77 Id. § 7(A). In addition, “[d]ocumentation and supporting information 
shall be maintained” and shall be made available to the commissioner upon 
the commissioner’s request. Id. 
78 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, NAIC OWN RISK AND SOLVENCY 
ASSESSMENT (ORSA) GUIDANCE MANUAL, at iii (2017). 
79 Id. at 8. 
80 Id. at 10–11 (“The analysis of an insurer’s group assessment of risk 
capital requirements and associated capital adequacy description should be 
accompanied by a description of the approach used in conducting the 
analysis. This should include key methodologies, assumptions and 
considerations used in quantifying available capital and risk capital.”). 
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In contrast to the ordinary capital rules that states apply to individual 
insurance entities, the ORSA Manual’s direction for group capital 
calculations provide insurers with substantial latitude in their calculations. 
Under the manual, insurers are allowed to select their own methodologies 
and assumptions for calculating their group capital, so long as they describe 
and explain their approach.  
The ORSA Manual’s latitude in specifying how insurers should 
calculate their group capital may change soon. Many foreign regulators have 
expressed concern about state insurance regulators’ lack of a standardized 
group capital requirement, and states have responded by developing a variety 
of much more specific principles for group capital calculations. State 
regulators have emphasized, however, that they do not plan to implement 
this new group capital methodology as an independent quantitative 
requirement, but instead intend to use it solely as an “additional regulatory 
assessment tool.”81 This strongly suggests that state regulators may 
implement their new group capital methodology simply by amending the 
ORSA Manual rather than by establishing a new group capital model law or 
regulation. 
New changes to the ORSA Manual’s group capital rules would not 
be the first NAIC update of the manual. While the NAIC first adopted the 
ORSA Manual in 2014, it subsequently amended the manual in 2017. The 
most important changes to the manual created a process for the NAIC to 
update the manual in the future. Those procedures designated a specific 
NAIC group as being responsible for updating the manual and contained no 
requirement that NAIC members as a whole approve changes to the 
document. 
3. Dynamic Incorporation by Reference of the Accounting 
Practices and Procedures Manual 
A third example of state delegation to the NAIC via dynamic 
incorporation by reference concerns insurers’ accounting practices. Every 
state requires by statute that insurers report their financial information to 
insurance regulators using a unique set of insurance-specific accounting 
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rules known as Statutory Accounting Principles (“SAP”).82 Although these 
accounting rules are termed “statutory,” they are not, in fact, contained in 
any state statute. Instead, they are detailed in the voluminous, multi-volume, 
NAIC Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual (AP&P Manual), the 
latest version of which state laws incorporate by reference. As with the 
Valuation Manual and ORSA Manual, the NAIC’s accreditation program 
requires this delegation of authority to the NAIC as a condition for states to 
maintain their financial accreditation.83 This, of course, explains why states 
                                                 
82 The history of the AP&P Manual demonstrates the NAIC’s intentional 
use of the incorporation by reference process to establish itself as a body with 
pseudo-Congressional power to pass laws for the entire country. Before 
2000, the NAIC published a series of Accounting Practices and Procedures 
Manuals, slim volumes for each different line of insurance, housed in loose 
leaf binders which allowed for updating. The title of these manuals was 
incorporated by reference in state statutes, mandating the use of the statutory 
accounting regime they established. During the 1990s, NAIC members 
concluded that a full, comprehensive rewrite of the accounting manual was 
necessary to establish a uniform national regulatory requirement for 
accounting practices. The new work product was massive. Including 
subsequent amendments, this amounted to over 1,000 pages of new material. 
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CODIFICATION OF STATUTORY 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES STATE IMPLEMENTATION (2000). The NAIC 
intentionally gave the new manual the same name as the already incorporated 
by reference accounting manuals, so that, it asserted, the new AP&P Manual 
would automatically become the law upon NAIC adoption. NAIC members 
faithfully followed this guidance, sending out bulletins to regulated entities, 
explaining that a sea change was being made to their accounting 
requirements, not by lawmaking in their states, but by the decree of the NAIC 
through the incorporation by reference mechanism; and further explaining 
that NAIC intended to make changes every year to the Manual which would 
also automatically become new law in each state. See id. 
83 Unlike the valuation and ORSA documents, the NAIC does not 
maintain a model law or regulation that broadly requires this delegation, 
though several model laws do indeed dynamically incorporate by reference 
the AP&P Manual in a narrower context. See, e.g., INVS. OF INSURERS 
MODEL ACT § 7 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2017). Instead, the NAIC’s 
Accreditation program directly requires that states mandate companies 
follow the AP&P Manual, without specifying how exactly they must 
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have so uniformly delegated to the NAIC the power to set the accounting 
rules that bind insurers through the AP&P Manual.  
The AP&P Manual is voluminous, but – unlike the NAIC’s 
Valuation or ORSA manuals – it is not freely available to the public. Instead, 
each user must pay approximately $500 to access the manual.84 The manual 
covers an immense range of insurance-specific accounting and reporting 
rules, as suggested by the fact that its table of contents alone is fifteen pages 
long. Examples of topics covered include the subset of assets that insurers 
can include on their balance sheets, the proper accounting treatment of 
anticipated premiums tax benefits, and the accounting treatment of 
reinsurance transactions.  
The special accounting rules detailed in the AP&P Manual are 
ostensibly intended to better reflect the capacity of insurers to pay their 
commitments to policyholders if they had to be liquidated, in contrast to 
GAAP’s focus on facilitating outsiders’ assessments of a firm’s market 
value.85 Reflecting SAP’s conservatism relative to GAAP, the AP&P manual 
is often substantially more prescriptive than GAAP. For instance, SAP 
requires property/casualty insurers to value high-quality bonds at amortized 
cost rather than market value, whereas GAAP allows insurers to select 
between these two approaches depending on their anticipated plans for the 
bonds.86 Similarly, SAP only allows insurers to include on their balance 
sheets admitted assets, which can be readily converted to cash.87  
                                                 
accomplish this result. See NAIC ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 
45, at 9 (“The department should require that all companies reporting to the 
department file the appropriate NAIC annual statement blank, which should 
be prepared in accordance with the NAIC’s instructions handbook and 
follow those accounting procedures and practices prescribed by the NAIC’s 
Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual, utilizing the version effective 
January 1, 2001 and all subsequent revisions adopted by the Financial 
Regulation Standards and Accreditation (F) Committee.”). 
84 See Cunningham, supra note 34, at 292-93 (considering when private 
publications that operate as law should be made freely available to the 
public). 
85 See Weber, supra note 67, at 53–63. 
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The manual is routinely updated by the NAIC’s Statutory 
Accounting Principles (E) Working Group.88 The Working Group considers 
whether each new GAAP item should be adopted or adjusted for insurance 
in the AP&P Manual.89 It also maintains a public tool for anyone to propose 
items to be updated in the manual.90 By way of illustration, the working 
group recently considered twenty-seven different proposed revisions to the 
AP&P Manual and it regularly adopts dozens of revisions to the manual each 
year. 
Notwithstanding state mandates that carriers comply with the latest 
version of the AP&P Manual, individual states have the authority to depart 
from the AP&P Manual in two scenarios. First, states can adopt via statute 
or regulation “Prescribed Accounting Practices” that alter SAP rules for all 
insurers domiciled in the state. Second, the manual also authorizes state 
regulators to allow “Permitted Accounting Practices” for individual insurers 
who request approval for departures from SAP.91 In either case, insurers must 
disclose their reliance on these exceptions from SAP in their financial 
statements. 
II. THE LAW GOVERNING STATE LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION 
OF POWERS TO PRIVATE ACTORS 
Just like the federal constitution, every state constitution vests an 
independent branch of state government with the legislative power. And just 
like the federal constitution, a corollary of this principle is that the legislature 
has limited authority to delegate this power elsewhere. Legislative 
delegations of power to a private actor, as opposed to a government agency, 
are particularly troubling, as they implicate not just separation of powers 
principles, but also more fundamental due process concerns.  
                                                 
88 For instance, the initial Codification of SAP in 2001 imposed an initial 
73 Statements of Statutory Accounting Principles upon regulated companies. 
As of today, the number of SSAPs has grown to 10,757. 
89 See Deborah L. Lindberg & Deborah L. Seifert, A New Paradigm of 
Reporting on the Horizon, 29 J. INS. REG. 229, 242 (2010). 
90 Statutory Accounting Principles € Working Group, NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMM'RS, https://naic.org/cmte_e_app_sapwg.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 
2018).  
91 Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP), NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM'RS, 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_statutory_accounting_principles.ht
m (last visited Jan. 6, 2019). 
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For these reasons, state courts from across the country have 
invalidated a broad range of legislative delegations to private parties. In 
doing so, they generally employ what amounts to a multi-factor balancing 
test that considers (i) the public or private status of the delegate, (ii) oversight 
of the delegate by public bodies such as the judiciary or a public agency, and 
(iii) the delegate’s independence from the lawmaking function.  
This Part overviews this caselaw, abstracting away from the law of 
any individual state to derive and illustrate the general principles that 
influence state court scrutiny of legislative delegations to private actors. 
After briefly reviewing states’ generalized non-delegation doctrines in 
Section A, Section B explores why state delegations to private parties raise 
distinctive issues. Section C then distills the relevant factors that state courts 
consider in assessing the constitutionality of delegations to private actors. 
Finally, Section D illustrates the application of these principles in two 
contexts that resemble the states’ delegation of power to the NAIC: state 
incorporation of American Medical Association standards in workers’ 
compensation statutes, and state and federal delegations of authority to the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board to set accounting rules for private 
entitles. 
A.    STATES’ NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINES 
The non-delegation doctrine limits legislatures’ constitutional 
authority to delegate their powers to third parties.92 It is typically rooted in 
separation of powers principles.93 Consistent with this foundation, the vast 
majority of non-delegation cases concern legislative delegations to executive 
agencies, courts, or other governmental entities.94  
                                                 
92 See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 
327, 335–43 (2002). 
93 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of 
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1167, 1190 (1999). Contra Joseph Postell, “The People Surrender 
Nothing”: Social Compact Theory, Republicanism, and the Modern 
Administrative State, 81 MO. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (2016) (“[T]he true 
foundation of the nondelegation principle is the idea of the social compact 
and the related theory of republican government.”).  
94 Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: 
Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619, 641 (2017). 
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Although the non-delegation doctrine is virtually a dead letter in 
federal jurisprudence,95 it is quite robust in state courts.96 Indeed, between 
1940 and 2015, 85% of all non-delegation cases were decided by state, rather 
than federal, courts.97 Parties seeking to invalidate a statutory delegation of 
power in these cases enjoyed a 16% success rate, which stands in stark 
contrast to the 3% success rate that their counterparts experienced in federal 
courts over the same time period.98 
Unlike the federal constitution – which is silent on the topic of non-
delegation – most state constitutions directly limit legislatures’ powers to 
delegate their law-making authority.99 These constitutional provisions come 
in three basic varieties. Some expressly prohibit any branch of government 
from exercising another’s powers.100 Other state constitutions prohibit the 
legislature from “making the passage of any law contingent upon any event 
or outside authority.”101 A third type of constitutional provision “explicitly 
                                                 
95 See Rossi, supra note 93, at 1178; Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, 
and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 452 (2014) (calling the federal non-
delegation doctrine “toothless”).  
96 See generally Rossi, supra note 93, at 1187–1201 (surveying state 
nondelegation doctrine and classifying states’ approaches as “weak,” 
“strong,” or “moderate”); Iuliano & Whittington, supra note 94, at 620 
(“[D]espite the doctrine’s disappearance at the federal level, it has become 
an increasingly important part of state constitutional law.”). 
97 Iuliano & Whittington, supra note 94, at 636. This survey examined a 
sample of 1,075 non-delegation cases decided between 1940 and 2015. 
98 Id. 
99 Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 416 (2017). 
100 Id. at 416. Whittington and Iuliano cite the Texas constitution as 
representative: “The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall 
be divided into three distinct departments…and no person, or collection of 
persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any powers 
properly attached to either of the others.” TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
101 Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 99, at 416. The authors cite 
Indiana’s constitution as an example: “No law shall be passed, the taking 
effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority, except as 
provided in this Constitution,” IND. CONST. art. I, § 25. 
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forbids the legislature from delegating any of its powers” to a variety of 
actors, including private entities.102 
Given this variation in constitutional text, it is no surprise that state 
caselaw on the non-delegation doctrine also varies significantly. One 
extensive survey grouped states’ approaches to the doctrine into three 
categories, though they do not correspond neatly to the three types of state 
constitutional provisions on the issue.103 First, some states uphold legislative 
delegations when the delegated power is subject to adequate procedural 
safeguards.104 Second, a larger group of states requires state legislatures to 
articulate substantive standards that constrain the exercise of delegated 
power and guide judicial review of the delegate’s actions.105 Finally, a third 
group of states employ a balancing test that considers both substantive and 
procedural restrictions on delegated power in light of various additional 
factors, such as the subject matter of the underlying statute.106 
                                                 
102 Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 99, at 416. The authors cite 
Colorado’s constitution as representative: “The general assembly shall not 
delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any 
power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property, or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy 
taxes or perform any municipal function whatever,” COLO. CONST. art. V, § 
35. 
103 Rossi, supra note 93, at 1187-1201. Rossi’s survey “updated and 
refined” an earlier survey by Gary Greco. Id. at 1191 n.108 (citing Gary J. 
Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the 
States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567 (1994)). 
104 Rossi, supra note 93, at 1191-93; see e.g., Warren v. Marion Cty., 
353 P.2d 257, 261 (Or. 1960) (in banc) (“[T]he important consideration is 
not whether the statute delegating the power expresses standards, but 
whether the procedure established for the exercise of the power furnishes 
adequate safeguards to those who are affected by the administrative 
action.”).  
105 Rossi, supra note 93, at 1193-97; see, e.g., Newport Int’l Univ., Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Educ., 186 P.3d 382, 390 (Wyo. 2008) (“The crucial test in 
determining whether there is an unlawful delegation is whether the statute 
contains sufficient standards to enable the agency to act and the courts to 
determine whether the agency is carrying out the legislature’s intent.”). 
106 Rossi, supra note 93, at 1198-1200; see e.g., Cottrell v. Denver, 636 
P.2d 703, 709 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (“[T]he test is not simply whether the 
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B.    THE UNIQUE CASE OF LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS TO PRIVATE 
PARTIES 
Courts at both the federal and state levels have long recognized that 
laws delegating legislative authority to private, rather than public, actors 
raise unique concerns.107 Perhaps the most well-known articulation of this 
view is from the 1936 Supreme Court case Carter v. Carter Coal Co., which 
involved a federal law authorizing private coal producers and miners to set 
binding wage and hour restrictions.108 In finding the law unconstitutional, the 
Court emphasized that it conferred power onto “private persons” rather than 
“an official or an official body,” and thus constituted “legislative delegation 
in its most obnoxious form.”109 Although federal caselaw building on this 
principle is limited, numerous state court decisions have similarly concluded 
that many, if not most, “private delegations are unconstitutional under the 
relevant state constitutions.”110 
State courts’ skepticism toward legislative delegation to private 
parties is generally driven just as much by due process and rule of law 
concerns as by separation of powers principles.111 Unlike public entities 
authorized to exercise legislative powers, like executive agencies or courts, 
“private delegates may not be subject to direct political controls nor to due 
process, administrative procedure laws, freedom of information laws, or 
judicial review.”112 Private entities may also labor under conflicts of interest 
that harm their competitors or other private actors.113  
                                                 
delegation is guided by standards, but whether there are sufficient statutory 
standards and safeguards and administrative standards and safeguards, in 
combination, to protect against unnecessary and uncontrolled exercise of 
discretionary power.”). 
107 E.g., Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 837 (Pa. 
2017). 
108 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
109 Id. at 311. 
110 Calvin R. Massey, The Non-Delegation Doctrine and Private Parties, 
17 GREEN BAG 2D 157, 171 (2014). 
111 Id. at 167–68. 
112 MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 395 (3d. ed. 2009).  
113 See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.  
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Despite these concerns, delegation of authority to private entities is 
sometimes both necessary and beneficial. State governments lacking 
resources or expertise may look to private organizations for regulatory 
guidance.114 In some contexts, a need for uniformity across states may drive 
legislatures to adopt a national organization’s standards.115 And legislatures 
may decide it would be expedient to delegate a degree of regulatory power 
to the private parties subject to regulation.116 
One of the most common ways in which state legislatures delegate 
authority to private actors is by incorporating privately-produced rules or 
standards into statutes. Not all statutory references to private entities’ 
materials implicate the non-delegation doctrine. Statutes that incorporate 
pre-existing sources are perfectly innocuous. In such cases, the legislature 
has had an opportunity to review and affirmatively adopt the incorporated 
standards and the reference operates as a mere legislative short-hand.117 
However, when a statute cross-references not just existing materials, but also 
prospectively adopts – sight unseen – future changes made by private actors 
to incorporated materials, the statute transfers to those actors the capacity to 
change the law.118 This is just as much a delegation of legislative power to 
private actors as more explicit delegation of the type at issue in Carter Coal. 
                                                 
114 See In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796–97 (Minn. 1978).  
115 See Lucas v. Me. Comm'n of Pharmacy, 472 A.2d 904, 911 (Me. 
1984) (noting a need for uniform education standards for pharmacists and 
health professionals).  
116 See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 
S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997), as supplemented on denial of reh'g (Oct. 9, 1997) 
(invalidating a statute designed to give farmers control over an agricultural 
pest eradication program).  
117 See Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 731 (Md. 1989). 
However, some early non-delegation cases suggested that statutes 
incorporating another jurisdiction’s laws, even without dynamic 
incorporation of changes, were invalid because the practice sidestepped 
important legislative processes. See F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law: 
Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 LA. L. REV. 1201, 1211–12, 1254–
55 (2008). 
118 See Bd. of Trs., 562 A.2d at 731; Boyd, supra note 117, at 1254–57.  
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C.    KEY FACTORS IN ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS TO PRIVATE ACTORS 
Although state legislatures commonly delegate authority to private 
organizations, the non-delegation doctrine places limits on the practice.119 
State courts have found that a wide variety of delegations to private actors 
exceed these limits.120 Just like the state caselaw addressing non-delegation 
principles generally,121 the subset of this caselaw focused on delegations to 
private parties is varied, both within and across states. State courts have 
developed varying and overlapping multi-factor tests for assessing when 
legislative delegations of power to private actors are constitutionally 
permissible,122 and some have even suggested that all delegations of power 
to private entities are unconstitutional.123 This subsection distills from this 
caselaw several of the most important factors124 that influence state courts’ 
                                                 
119 See generally Boyd, supra note 117, at 1251–60 (discussing the non-
delegation doctrine as a constraint on incorporation by reference); Tex. Boll 
Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 465–69, 471–72.  
120 See, e.g., Gumbhir v. Kan. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 618 P.2d 837 (Kan. 
1980) (university accreditation); Hillman v. N. Wasco Cty. People’s Util. 
Dist., 323 P.2d 664, 670 (Or. 1958) (state electrical code), overruled on other 
grounds by Maulding v. Clackamas Cty., 563 P.2d 731 (Or. 1977); Protz v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017) (workers’ 
compensation); Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d 454 (pest-control program).  
121 See supra Section II.A.  
122 Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470 (recognizing that non-delegation 
cases “do not yet, when taken together, evince a coherent constitutional 
standard”).  
123 For instance, the intermediate appellate court in Protz v. W.C.A.B. 
(Derry Area Sch. Dist.), 124 A.3d 406, 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), held that all 
delegations of authority to private entities violate the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately did not reach this 
issue, though, concluding that the state’s incorporation by reference of the 
AMA’s impairment standards could not withstand constitutional scrutiny 
even if the AMA were a governmental entity. See Protz v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d at 837. 
124 The list is not intended to be exhaustive, but instead to focus on those 
factors that are most significant in the caselaw and relevant to states’ 
delegation of power to the NAIC. For instance, in addition to the factors 
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analysis of legislative delegation to private actors: (1) whether the delegate 
is a public or private entity; (2) whether the delegate’s exercise of authority 
is directly policed by public officials, including courts or regulators; and (3) 
the extent to which the delegate is independent from the lawmaking process 
and exercising objective expertise rather than making policy. 
1. Is the Delegate a Private or Public Entity? 
For reasons described above, courts universally recognize that 
legislative delegations of power to private actors raise more significant 
constitutional concerns than delegations of power to government entities.125 
Application of this principle is straight-forward in most cases, even though 
                                                 
discussed in this Section, legislatures may not delegate “inherent 
government functions” to non-government entities. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra 
note 112, at 396; see, e.g., State v. Curley-Egan, 910 A.2d 200 (Vt. 2006) 
(police power); Christ v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 644 A.2d 34, 42 (Md. 1994) 
(dicta); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of 
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 424–26 (2006) (discussing 
non-delegable government functions at the federal level). As a corollary, 
courts are reluctant to allow delegations to private entities when the 
delegated power involves criminal penalties. See, e.g., B.H. v. State, 645 
So.2d 987, 993 (Fla. 1994); Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472. Courts 
may also consider whether a delegation vests both rulemaking and 
adjudicatory power in the same entity. Id. Finally, so long as the legislature 
“determines the rights, duties, and liabilities of persons and corporations 
under certain conditions of fact,” it may delegate (even to private parties) 
“the duty of ascertaining when the facts exist which call into activity certain 
provisions of the law.” State v. Gee, 236 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Ariz. 1951) 
(quoting Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 219 (Wis. 1911)); accord State 
v. Wakeen, 57 N.W.2d 364, 367 (Wis. 1953). 
125 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (labeling 
delegation to private parties, “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious 
form”); Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 730 (Md. 1989) 
(“[D]elegations of legislative authority to private entities are strictly 
scrutinized because, unlike governmental officials or agencies, private 
persons will often be wholly unaccountable to the general public.”); Tex. Boll 
Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470. 
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the public/private distinction is itself often hazy.126 For instance, 
corporations and professional associations are generally private, whereas 
entities that are formed by statute, constitution, or regulation are typically 
public.  
But this distinction is less clear when legislatures create ostensibly 
private entities and grant them legal or regulatory authority. In such cases, 
courts typically resist formalistic analysis that gives definitive weight to the 
delegate’s charter type. Instead, they typically weigh the relative role of 
private citizens and government actors in controlling the delegate’s decision-
making, operations, and objectives to determine whether the delegation is 
public or private.  
This focus on who controls a delegate’s operations is illustrated by 
a Texas Supreme Court case invalidating a statute that created a foundation 
and delegated to it control over an agricultural pest eradication program. 
Despite the legislature’s creation of the foundation and specification of its 
objectives, the court deemed the foundation to be private for purposes of the 
non-delegation doctrine because its board was composed solely of farmers 
with a direct private interest in the program’s implementation.127 Farmers’ 
control over the foundation rendered the delegation private because 
“courts have universally treated a delegation as private where ‘interested 
groups have been given authoritative powers of determination.’”128  
Courts’ focus on who controls hybrid public/private entities that are 
delegated authority is also illustrated by a recent U.S. Supreme Court case 
applying the federal non-delegation doctrine. In Department of 
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, the Court rejected a 
non-delegation challenge to a statute empowering Amtrak to help develop 
performance and service quality metrics for the broader industry.129 This 
result followed from the Court’s conclusion that Amtrak was a public, rather 
than a private, entity for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine, 
notwithstanding its status as a for-profit corporation.130 Amtrak, the Court 
emphasized, was not only created by federal law, but was controlled by 
                                                 
126 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003). 
127 Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 471. 
128 Id. at 470–71. 
129 Dept. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). 
130 Id. at 1232–33. 
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federal officials who played a major role in directing its objectives and 
operations.131 For instance, Amtrak’s board is largely appointed by the 
President, confirmed by the Senate, subject to removal at-will.132 Moreover, 
the federal government owns nearly all of Amtrak’s stock.133 Amtrak is also 
subject to various traditional government oversight tools: the Freedom of 
Information Act applies to it, and it is required to maintain an inspector 
general.  
In addition to these formal government controls over Amtrak’s 
operations, the Court emphasized that the federal government also holds 
extensive practical control over the rail company. For instance, Amtrak is 
required to submit annual reports to Congress, which frequently holds 
hearings scrutinizing the company’s budget, routes, and service. Congress 
also exercises extensive informal control over Amtrak by subsidizing the 
company’s operations to a tune of $40 billion over the course of 
approximately four decades. The federal government, the Court concluded, 
“extensively supervise[s] and substantially fund[s]” Amtrak’s “priorities, 
operations, and decisions.”134 In sum, the federal government’s control over 
Amtrak rendered it a public entity for purposes of the non-delegation 
doctrine, meaning that Congress’s delegation of power to the railroad raised 
limited issues under the federal constitution. 
2. Is the Private Delegate’s Exercise of Authority 
Adequately Policed by Judges or Administrative 
Bodies? 
To the extent that a legislature has indeed delegated authority to a 
private rather than a public actor, a second key consideration under states’ 
non-delegation doctrines is whether the private delegate’s power is 
adequately policed by judges or administrative bodies. Both state and federal 
courts have generally tolerated legislative delegations to private entities 
when public officials exercise sufficient oversight over the private delegate’s 
decision-making.135 Such oversight can come in varying forms, ranging from 
                                                 
131 Id. at 1232 (“[Amtrak] was created by the Government, is controlled 
by the Government, and operates for the Government’s benefit.”). 
132 Id. at 1231-32. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1232. 
135 See Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 928 P.2d 250, 258 (N.M. 1996); cf. 
Sunshine Anthracite Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940) (holding 
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judicial review of the entity’s compliance with substantive or procedural 
requirements, to direct oversight of the delegate’s actions by a government 
agency.136 
For instance, courts generally permit delegations to private parties 
when the delegating statute articulates substantive standards to guide the 
delegate’s exercise of discretion, and compliance with these standards is 
judicially reviewable.137 This approach, of course, parallels the rules that 
govern delegations to public entities, such as agencies.138 It is therefore 
hardly surprising that courts often conflate the rules governing these two 
types of delegations.139 But consistent with the unique concerns implicated 
by delegations to private entities, courts sometimes suggest that the 
substantive constraints on private delegations must be more specific than 
                                                 
Congress may give private entities a role in rulemaking so long as the private 
entity functions subordinately to the government); Pittston Co. v. United 
States, 368 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[C]ongress may employ private 
entities for ministerial or advisory roles, but it may not give these entities 
governmental power over others.”). See generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing 
Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private 
Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1059 (2005) (“But court decisions, 
including by the Supreme Court, demonstrate that governmental oversight 
of private decision making will generally insulate Congress's private 
delegations from constitutional challenge.”). 
136 Compare United Chiropractors of Wash., Inc. v. State, 578 P.2d 38, 
39–40 (Wash. 1978) (emphasizing the legislature’s obligation to establish 
standards, guidelines, and procedural safeguards), with Tex. Boll Weevil 
Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 473 (Tex. 1997), as 
supplemented on denial of reh'g (Oct. 9, 1997) (analyzing Commissioner of 
Agriculture’s direct oversight over private foundation, among several other 
factors). 
137 See, e.g., Newport Int’l Univ., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 186 P.3d 382, 
390 (Wyo. 2008); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 735–36, 737–38 
(Tex. 1998). 
138 See supra Section II.A. 
139 E.g., Colo. Polytechnic Coll. v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & 
Occupational Educ., 476 P.2d 38, 42 (Colo. 1970). But cf. Texas Boll 
Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472–73 (establishing separate non-delegation test for 
delegations to private entities).  
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those on delegations to public actors.140 For instance, at least one court has 
suggested that private delegations should be “narrow in duration, extent, and 
subject matter.”141  
A second way that public oversight may allow private delegations to 
pass constitutional scrutiny is if the delegate’s authority must be exercised 
in accordance with judicially-enforceable procedural restrictions.142 Here 
too, the caselaw parallels precedent governing delegations to public 
agencies, though comparison is slightly muddied because private entities are 
not subject to procedural rules such as state administrative procedure acts 
and sunshine laws. Procedural restrictions on private delegates’ capacity to 
exercise delegated authority must consequently be contained within the 
delegating statute. Such judicially-enforceable procedural restrictions on 
delegations can help prevent arbitrary or self-interested decision-making by 
the delegate.143 Because private delegations raise particularly salient 
concerns of bias, courts reviewing challenges to such delegations often 
emphasize whether parties affected by the delegate’s exercise of authority 
are involved in the decision-making process, such as through a notice and 
comment process.144 
Procedural and substantive restrictions on a private delegate’s power 
are only relevant for purposes of constitutional analysis if they are legally 
                                                 
140 Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 730 (Md. 
1989) (“[D]elegations of legislative authority to private entities are strictly 
scrutinized. . . .”); accord Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 469 (“[W]e 
believe it axiomatic that courts should subject private delegations to a more 
searching scrutiny than their public counterparts.”).  
141 See Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472. 
142 See supra Section II.A. As with the ordinary non-delegation doctrine, 
some courts require a combination of procedural and substantive 
restrictions. See, e.g., United Chiropractors of Wash., Inc. v. State, 578 P.2d 
38, 39–41 (Wash. 1978).  
143 See Protz v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 834 (Pa. 
2017).  
144 See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472–74 (analyzing statutory 
requirement that private delegate’s board be elected by affected parties); 
Indep. Electricians & Elec. Contractors' Ass'n v. N.J. Bd. of Examiners of 
Elec. Contractors, 256 A.2d 33, 42 (N.J. 1969) (noting that private delegate’s 
procedures in adopting and revising its standards reflect the national 
consensus of interested parties). 
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mandated and judicially reviewable, rather than voluntarily adopted.145 This 
is because the non-delegation doctrine restricts legislatures’ ability to 
delegate power “regardless of the manner in which the recipient wields it.”146 
Thus, the fact that a delegate “has opted to use its powers for good,” such as 
by self-imposing procedural restraints, “is no antidote” to a lack of 
constitutional power.147 
Judicial review of a delegate’s compliance with procedural or 
substantive restrictions is not the only way that public oversight can 
legitimize delegations of power to private actors. Direct oversight of a 
private delegate’s decision-making by an administrative agency can also 
curb arbitrary or self-interested actions sufficiently to avoid the 
constitutional problems that undergird the non-delegation doctrine.148 This 
strategy of administrative oversight of private delegates is central to 
insulating from challenge a number of federal delegations of power to private 
entities. For instance, the key private bodies that play a role in securities 
regulation – including the Financial Standards Accounting Board (FASB), 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) – are all directly overseen by the SEC.149 In each case, federal courts 
have rejected federal non-delegation challenges to these entities on the basis 
of such direct oversight by the SEC.150  
                                                 
145 Although courts are not always explicit about the assumption that 
procedural or substantive restrictions must be judicially reviewable, they 
reliable operate on this assumption. See, e.g., Protz, 161 A.3d at 834, 836; 
Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472–74. As one court has stated in the 
context of a public non-delegation case, “a corollary of the doctrine of 
unlawful delegation is the availability of judicial review.” Askew v. Cross 
Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. 1978). 
146 Protz, 161 A.3d at 835 n.4. 
147 Id.; cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) 
(“[B]eneficent aims, however great or well directed, can never serve in lieu 
of constitutional power.”).  
148 See Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472–73 (describing agency 
oversight of private delegate as “uneven and incomplete”).  
149 Nagy, supra note 13535, at 1022, 1057–61. 
150 See, e.g., Todd & Co. Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., 557 F.2d 1008, 
1012–14 (3d Cir. 1977); R.H. Johnson & Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., 198 
 
236 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 25 
 
Judicial or administrative oversight of a delegate may be 
constitutionally sufficient when a public official retains discretion in 
adopting or applying the standards.151 For instance, if enforcement of a 
private delegate’s standards requires agency officials or judges to exercise 
their discretion in applying the standard, or to use it as only one factor in 
their decision-making, then there may be no impermissible delegation of 
legislative power.152 In such cases, a government official maintains control 
over the legal effects of a delegate’s decisions, meaning that the delegate 
does not have unconstrained “power to determine what the law will be.”153 
Other courts have suggested that delegations of power to private institutions 
are more likely to be constitutionally permissible if impacted parties can seek 
review from public officials of any adverse decision by the delegate.154  
At least some commentators have suggested that, in addition to 
judicial or administrative oversight, legislative oversight of a private 
delegate is sufficient under the non-delegation doctrine.155 Under this view, 
the key consideration for assessing the constitutionality of a private 
delegation is “the ease with which Congress [or state legislatures] could 
reclaim or amend its delegation.”156 Because legislatures generally do not 
                                                 
F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1952); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n., No. 76C-2832, 1978 WL 1073, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1978). 
151 See Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 928 P.2d 250, 257 (N.M. 1996); Bd. 
of Tr. of the Emp. Retirement Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. 
Mayor & City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 732 (Md. 1989). 
152 See, e.g., Madrid, 928 P.2d at 258 (“Where evidence is conflicting, 
the ultimate decision concerning the degree of a worker’s impairment and 
disability rests with the workers’ compensation judge.”); Bd. of Tr. of the 
Emp. Retirement Sys., 562 A.2d at 732 (Md. 1989). 
153 Madrid, 928 P.2d at 256. 
154 See In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796-797 (Minn. 1978); Newport 
Int’l Univ., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 186 P.3d 382, 390 (Wyo. 2008). 
155See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A 
Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
1347, 1360-84 (1996). 
156 Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1381, 1428 n.240 (2007). 
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face constraints in clawing back power from private delegates, most such 
delegations to private actors are unproblematic on this view.157 
3. Does the Delegate’s Exercise of Authority Have 
Significance Independent of the Incorporating Statute? 
Another relevant factor to state constitutional analysis of private 
delegations is whether the delegate’s actions have any significance 
independent of the statute that delegated authority to it. To the extent that a 
delegate’s exercise of authority is “guided by objectives unrelated to the 
statute in which [the material] function[s],” then it is less plausible to 
“construe [it] as a deliberate law-making act” of the type that would 
potentially violate the non-delegation doctrine.158 This factor is most clearly 
applicable to dynamic incorporations by reference, where a statute gives 
legal effect to both existing and future versions of referenced material.159 
However, courts have also considered a private delegate’s independent 
purpose in cases where the delegate receives a more direct delegation of 
authority from the legislature.160  
A private delegate’s actions are likely to have significance 
independent of a legislative delegation when they are motivated by concerns 
that are not principally legal or regulatory. For example, when a private 
entity updates standards that are dynamically incorporated by reference in a 
statute to reflect scientific advances – rather than to influence the way the 
statute operates – its actions have independent significance.161 This, of 
course, is most likely to occur when the putative delegate has expertise that 
                                                 
157 See id. 
158 Madrid, 928 P.2d at 257; accord Lucas v. Me. Comm’n of Pharmacy, 
472 A.2d 904, 909 (Me. 1984). 
159 See Boyd, supra note 117, at 1255–57. 
160 See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen v. Abbott, 
952 S.W.2d 454, 474–75 (Tex. 1997), as supplemented on denial of 
reh'g (Oct. 9, 1997). 
161 See, e.g., State v. Wakeen, 57 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Wis. 1953) 
(upholding dynamic incorporation by reference of the United States 
Pharmacopeia’s definition of drug); Madrid, 928 P.2d at 259 (upholding 
incorporation of American Medical Association’s physical impairment 
guidelines). 
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is tied to a non-regulatory domain, such as science or education.162 The same 
conclusion may follow when a private delegate’s standards are used in a 
broad set of materials beyond the challenged statutory regime.163  
By contrast, private entities that exercise delegated authority for the 
sole or express purpose of influencing legal or regulatory standards are more 
likely to face successful non-delegation challenges. Delegates may be so 
influenced for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they can reap 
pecuniary benefits by influencing the law.164 For this reason, courts are often 
particularly skeptical of delegations to private entities that hold the prospect 
of substantially benefiting those parties’ finances.165 
One alternative explanation for courts’ consideration of a private 
delegate’s independence from the incorporating statute involves the practical 
ability of legislatures to claw back power from the private delegate.166 
Independent expert bodies that produce standards that happen to be 
dynamically incorporated into state law are unlikely to directly pressure state 
legislatures to retain their delegated authority. This means that the legislature 
has no practical restrictions on its ability to claw back authority from the 
delegate. By contrast, when private entities exercise delegated authority for 
the sole purpose of influencing legal or regulatory standards, they are likely 
to guard that authority jealously and employ various means to thwart the 
legislature’s practical ability to claw back that authority. 
                                                 
162 See, e.g., Colo. Polytechnic Coll. v. State Bd. for Cmty. Coll. & 
Occupation Educ., 476 P.2d at 42 (Colo. 1970) (expertise in post-secondary 
education); Lucas, 472 A.2d at 909–11 (pharmaceutical education); Hansen, 
275 N.W.2d at 796–97 (legal education); Wakeen, 57 N.W.2d at 369 
(pharmaceuticals). 
163 See Lucas, 472 A.2d at 909–11 (listing several uses for American 
Council on Pharmaceutical Education accreditation standards independent 
of their use in Maine’s pharmaceutical licensure statute). 
164 See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472; cf. Alexander Volokh, The 
New Private- Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and 
Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 941–42 (2014) 
(“[D]elegation of power plus pecuniary bias is a due process faux-pas, and it 
is easy to imagine (or presume) that such bias will be more likely if the 
delegate is private.”). 
165 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Texas Boll 
Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472. 
166 See supra Section II.C.2. 
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D.    APPLICATION OF PRIVATE NON-DELEGATION FACTORS IN 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND ACCOUNTING DELEGATIONS 
State courts have applied the considerations detailed above to 
countless different legislative delegations of power to private entities, 
ranging from organizations devoted to accrediting educational institutions to 
bodies developing standards to protect individuals’ privacy. This subsection 
focuses on caselaw analyzing delegations to private actors in two settings 
that closely parallel state delegation of insurance regulatory authority to the 
NAIC. The first involves state workers’ compensation statutes that rely on 
materials produced by the American Medical Association to help assess a 
worker’s physical impairment. The second focuses on delegations by both 
federal and state actors to the Financial Accounting Standards Board to set 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
1. Workers’ Compensation Statutes and the American 
Medical Association’s Impairment Guides 
State workers’ compensation statutes frequently rely on the 
American Medical Association’s (AMA) Impairment Guides to help 
ascertain the severity of workers’ physical disabilities and ultimately their 
compensation.167 When these statutes attempt to incorporate future versions 
of the Guides as promulgated by the AMA, they raise a non-delegation 
problem.168 However, courts applying the non-delegation factors above have 
reached mixed conclusions regarding such statutes’ constitutionality.  
For instance, in a 2017 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck 
down the state’s dynamic incorporation by reference of the AMA’s 
                                                 
167 See Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 835–36 (Pa. 
2017) (“[T]he General Assembly gave the AMA de facto, unfettered control 
over a formula that ultimately will determine whether a claimant’s partial-
disability benefits will cease after 500 weeks.”); McCabe v. North Dakota 
Workers Comp. Bureau, 567 N.W.2d 201, 205 (N.D. 1997). 
168 In McCabe v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, the court 
avoided the constitutional problems presented by dynamic incorporation by 
holding that the statute’s language does not incorporate future changes to the 
Guides. As such, the statute did not impermissibly delegate power to the 
AMA. McCabe, 567 N.W.2d 201. 
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impairment guidelines as an impermissible delegation.169 This scheme, the 
court held, violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s vesting of legislative 
power in the legislature because it did nothing to limit the AMA’s arbitrary 
and capricious exercise of this delegated power, effectively giving it “de 
facto, unfettered control over a formula” that determines a claimant’s 
recovery.170 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the statute 
failed to declare any policy regarding the Guides’ methods for evaluating 
physical impairment or to prescribe any standards to guide the AMA in 
creating its methodology.171 The court also noted a conspicuous lack of 
procedural safeguards binding the AMA’s drafting process, such as notice 
and comment procedures and judicial review.172 These factors ultimately led 
the court to conclude that the state’s delegation of power to the AMA would 
violate the State’s constitution even if the AMA were a governmental 
entity.173 But the court expressly declined to reject either the intermediate 
appellate court’s conclusion that all delegations of power to private entities 
violate the Pennsylvania Constitution or the more moderate view that private 
delegations require “a more exacting form of judicial scrutiny” than 
delegations to public actors.174 
By contrast, the Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the state’s 
dynamic incorporation of the Guides. 175 In Madrid v. St. Joseph Hospital, 
the court stressed that the AMA is a body with medical expertise that 
produces the Guides based on scientific objectives, rather than solely for use 
in New Mexico’s statute.176 It also emphasized that the statute made the 
Guides only one factor in determining a worker’s right to compensation, 
leaving the ultimate decision with the workers’ compensation judge. 177 Thus, 
public officials retained some discretion in applying the Guides, supporting 
the delegation. 
                                                 
169 Protz, 161 A.3d at 841. 
170 Id. at 836. 
171 Id. at 835–36. 
172 Id. at 836. 
173 Id. at 838. 
174 Id. 
175 Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 928 P.2d 250 (N.M. 1996). 
176 Id. at 257–58. 
177 Id. at 258; cf. McCabe v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 567 N.W.2d 
201, 205 (N.D. 1997). 
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2. Delegation to FASB to Develop Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles 
Both federal and state authorities delegate power to the Financial 
Standards Accounting Board (FASB) to update GAAP. FASB’s authority 
over GAAP stems from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which 
authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish a 
common system of accounting.178 The SEC initially sub-delegated this 
authority to the primary trade association of the accounting profession,179 and 
later shifted this delegation to FASB, a private, non-profit corporation whose 
Board is selected by a panel of accounting professionals.180 FASB Board 
members are full-time employees of FASB who are drawn from the 
accounting profession. Although the SEC does not play any direct role within 
FASB’s institutional structure, it devotes extensive resources to monitoring 
the organization’s agenda and operations, through a dedicated SEC Office of 
the Chief Accountant.181 Although the SEC has direct authority to overrule 
FASB, it generally influences FASB decision making more subtly by using 
suggestions and the implicit threat of a veto.182  
Because the SEC’s delegation of power to FASB is a matter of 
federal law, there is limited state case law on point. One exception is an 
intermediate appellate case from Texas, which addressed a non-delegation 
challenge to a Texas statute that required companies to compute their tax 
obligations using “generally accepted accounting principles.”183 The Texas 
Comptroller interpreted this provision to refer to GAAP, as promulgated by 
FASB. In rejecting the argument that this interpretation amounted to an 
                                                 
178 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012). 
179 See Nagy, supra note 135, at 985. 
180 William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New 
Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5 
(2007). 
181 Id. at 36. 
182 Id. See also Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, The Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board: 
Regulation Through Veto-Based Delegation, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 2, 7–14 
(1994); D. Paul Newman, The SEC's Influence on Accounting Standards: 
The Power of the Veto, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 134, 143 (1981). 
183 Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Sharp, 919 S.W.2d 485, 492 (Tex. App.– 
Austin 1996). 
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unconstitutional delegation of power to a private entity, the Texas court 
emphasized that FASB “operates without reference to any legislative 
purpose, and it does not make its pronouncements in order to fulfill or 
effectuate any statute.”184 The Court also noted that the Comptroller’s rules 
specifically did not make GAAP unconditionally binding on companies, but 
instead instructed companies to depart from GAAP when “the context clearly 
requires” doing so to avoid a misleading financial statement.185 Finally, the 
court reasoned that aggrieved taxpayers could go before the Comptroller to 
contest their tax liability. All this, the court held, demonstrated that “the 
Comptroller, not FASB, holds and exercises the properly delegated power to 
interpret and apply tax laws.”186 
Federal caselaw also makes clear that the SEC’s sub-delegation of 
authority to FASB is constitutional. Although no federal case explicitly 
reaches this conclusion, federal courts have routinely rejected nondelegation 
challenges to the SEC’s delegation of power to other private entities, such as 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). In doing so, they 
generally emphasize that NASD’s decisions are "subject to full review by 
the S.E.C., a wholly public body, which must base its decision on its own 
findings."187 This logic, of course, is equally applicable to FASB. The 
constitutionality of the SEC’s delegation to FASB is only enhanced by the 
fact that Congress, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, conditioned FASB’s 
authority on it meeting five conditions.188 These conditions required the 
organization to be entirely private, maintain procedures ensuring prompt 
consideration of emerging accounting issues, and to be deemed by the SEC 
to be capable of improving the accuracy and effectiveness of financial 
reporting and investor protection.189 These restrictions on FASB’s 
composition and procedures, as well as the direct role for the SEC in 




187Todd & Co. v. Inc. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008, 1012–14 (3d Cir. 1977). See 
also R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1952). For an 
argument that the SEC’s delegation of power to FASB is indeed 
unconstitutional. See Bruce Edward Committe, The Delegation and 
Privatization of Financial Accounting Rulemaking Authority in the United 
States of America, 1 CRITICAL PERSP. ACCT. 145 (1990). 
188 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. § 7219(b), (e) (2012). 
189 Id. 
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assessing FASB’s competence, render the constitutionality of the SEC’s 
delegation to FASB clear. 
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. STATE 
INSURANCE REGULATORY REGIME 
Each state has its own precedents regarding the constitutionality of 
attempts by its legislature to delegate authority to private actors.190 
Moreover, even within a single state, different legislative delegations of 
authority to the NAIC pose distinct legal issues, as they vary with respect to 
relevant factors such as the substantive and procedural guidance that 
accompanies these delegations as well as state regulators’ discretion to 
depart from dynamically-incorporated NAIC manuals.191 For these reasons, 
it is impossible to conclusively assess the constitutionality of all state 
delegations of authority to the NAIC in every jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, this Section argues that most state delegations of 
authority to the NAIC raise major constitutional problems under the non-
delegation principles of most states. The analysis below explains this 
conclusion by focusing on the three factors that state courts have generally 
found to be influential in assessing the constitutionality of legislative 
delegations to private parties.192 First, Section A explains that the NAIC is a 
private entity for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine. Second, Section 
B shows that the NAIC’s exercise of its delegated authority is not subject to 
any meaningful oversight by the judiciary or individual state insurance 
departments. Finally, Section C argues that the NAIC’s production of 
dynamically-incorporated materials do not have significance independent of 
legislative delegations to the organization. The fact that the NAIC actively 
pressures state legislatures to delegate authority to it through its accreditation 
program strongly supports this conclusion. 
A.    THE NAIC IS A PRIVATE ACTOR FOR PURPOSES OF THE NON-
DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
As a private, non-profit corporation founded and controlled by state 
insurance commissioners, the NAIC is in some ways at the border of the 
                                                 
190 See supra Section II.C. 
191 See supra Section I.C. 
192 See supra Section II.C. 
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public/private divide. But when it comes to states’ non-delegation doctrines, 
the NAIC’s status as a private entity is relatively clear. From a formalistic 
perspective, this conclusion follows from the fact that the NAIC is registered 
as a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation in the state of Delaware.193 As a 
Delaware corporation, the NAIC is not subject to any of the safeguards that 
ordinarily apply to government bodies, such as state Freedom of Information 
Acts or Sunshine Laws.194  
Although some courts confronting non-delegation claims have 
resisted formalistic categorization of entities that are formed or controlled by 
legislatures, these cases do not apply to the NAIC. Unlike these cases – 
which are exemplified by Amtrak and the Texas Agricultural Pest 
Eradication Foundation195 – state insurance regulators, rather than state 
legislatures, founded the NAIC and control its operations.196 And they 
                                                 
193 See NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
(Adopted Oct. 1999), https://www.naic.org/documents/about_certificate_of 
_incorporation.pdf. The fact that the NAIC is a registered non-profit 
corporation, as compared to Amtrak’s status as a for profit corporation, may 
arguably weigh in favor of its status as a public rather than private entity. 
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit decision finding Amtrak to be a private entity 
emphasized its status as a for profit corporation, noting that this mission was 
at odds with the traditional mission of public entities to advance the common 
good. See Ass’n of Am. Railroads v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 
677 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Transp. v. 
Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 191 L. Ed. 2d 153 (2015). By 
contrast, the NAIC’s mission is expressly to “serv[e] the public interest” and 
promote “fundamental insurance regulatory goals” by assisting “state 
insurance regulators, individually and collectively.” See Mission, NAT’L 
ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018). As a charitable nonprofit, the NAIC also faces constraints on 
its expenditure of funds and must disclose information that private entities 
do not. But unlike virtually any other non-profit, the NAIC does not file 
Form 990 annual disclosures about its budget and activities, relying on an 
IRS private letter exempting it from this requirement. See Letter from Kevin 
M. McCarthy, NAIC President, to Edward R. Royce, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.naic.org/documents/committe 
es_ex_grlc_120320_royce_letter.pdf. 
194 These laws only apply to government entities.  
195 See supra Section II.C.1. 
196 See supra Section I.A. 
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formed it not to serve some independent public purpose, but instead to 
operate as an association that could assist them in performing their 
professional responsibilities.197 No court has ever held that a private 
corporation founded by non-legislative officials to operate as a professional 
association is a public entity for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine.  
Even for courts inclined to embrace a less formalistic approach to 
the public/private distinction, the NAIC’s private status for purposes of the 
non-delegation doctrine is clear. Recall that courts employing such a 
functional approach typically focus on the government’s control of the 
delegate’s decision-making, operations and objectives.198 Because it is state 
legislatures to whom state Constitutions delegate the legislative power, it is 
the legislature’s control over a delegate that is the focus of this inquiry.199 
Thus, Amtrak was a public entity because Congress played a central role in 
its operations and delegated to the President authority to appoint its Board.200  
Under this type of functional approach to the public/private divide, 
the NAIC is almost certainly a private entity because no state legislature 
exercises direct control over it. This conclusion follows from three 
considerations. First, any control that state legislatures have over the NAIC 
is fragmented among 56 jurisdictions.201 This is significant, as individual 
states’ non-delegation doctrines are rooted in their individual 
constitutions.202 Thus, the relevant question for any individual state is not 
whether states in the aggregate exercise sufficient control over the NAIC to 
render it a public entity. Instead, the relevant question is whether the 
government of the specific state where a case is filed sufficiently controls the 
NAIC. Fragmentation of state control over the NAIC means that the answer 
to this question must be “no.” To analogize, if the Minnesota legislature were 
to delegate authority to an Iowa agency, this delegation would best be 
understood as private rather than public under the Minnesota Constitution, 
because an Iowa agency is not democratically accountable to the people of 
Minnesota.  
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 See supra Section II.C.1. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 As discussed in Section I, the NAIC’s voting membership consists of 
the fifty states plus six additional jurisdictions. See supra Section I.A. 
202 See supra Section II.A. 
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Fragmented control of the NAIC by fifty-six different state 
insurance commissioners also undermines the organization’s accountability 
to any individual state legislature. State legislatures have limited incentives 
to directly monitor and attempt to exert control over national organizations 
like the NAIC, even if they might plausibly be able to do so through their 
influence over state insurance departments.203 This is but one example of a 
familiar tragedy of the commons problem: the costs of any such oversight 
would be borne entirely by the state, but the benefits would be diffused 
nationally.204 By contrast, the federal government’s control over Amtrak, for 
instance, allowed it to pursue a unified objective with respect to the 
railroad.205 
A second reason that the NAIC is a private entity even under a 
functional approach to the non-delegation doctrine is that, unlike other 
hybrid public-private entities, the NAIC is not subject to any supplemental 
laws that imbue it with public features. Cases that have found ostensibly 
private corporations like Amtrak to be public entities have highlighted the 
unique constraints that legislatures imposed on these entities.206 To illustrate, 
Amtrak was required by statute to comply with the Freedom of Information 
Act, to maintain an Inspector General, and to regularly submit formal reports 
to Congress.207 Even the Texas Boll Weavel foundation – which the court 
ultimately deemed private – was subject to public safeguards, such as a 
                                                 
203 See Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of 
Insurers in the United States, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537, 550 (2015) (noting 
limited incentives of states insurance regulators to devote sufficient attention 
to matters of national or international concern, like systemic risk). 
204 Although state legislatures try to overcome these coordination 
problems through organizations like the National Conference of Insurance 
Legislatures (NCOIL), these efforts only prove the larger point: NCOIL is 
universally understood to be a less prominent and important organization 
than the NAIC, a telling fact given that state legislatures are generally 
supposed to have oversight responsibilities over state regulators. 
205 See supra Section II.C.1. 
206 See id. 
207 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232 
(2015). 
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requirement that it publish its rules and the prospect of dissolution by a 
public official.208 No such requirements apply to the NAIC.  
Finally, unlike the cases finding privately-chartered corporations to 
be public for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine, states do not play a 
meaningful role in funding the NAIC. To the contrary, state funds ultimately 
contribute a tiny fraction to the NAIC’s budget.209 The vast majority of the 
NAIC’s revenue instead stems from its sale of services and publications to 
the insurance industry.210 This is significant, as it means that states have 
limited informal control over the NAIC’s actions flowing from their financial 
backing of the organization.211 
The NAIC, in sum, is a private entity for purposes of states’ non-
delegation doctrines. Under a formalistic analysis, this conclusion flows 
naturally from the fact that the NAIC is chartered as a Delaware corporation 
founded by state regulators, rather than state legislatures. From a more 
functional perspective, states’ fragmented control over the organization 
means that it is not controlled by or accountable to any individual state. State 
legislatures also lack any indirect authority over the NAIC as it is not subject 
to any supplemental public safeguards and it is funded almost entirely by its 
sale of services and publications to the insurance industry. 
                                                 
208 See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 
S.W.2d 454, 470-471 (Tex. 1997), as supplemented on denial of reh'g (Oct. 
9, 1997). 
209 See supra Section I.A. 
210 See supra Section I.A. 
211 Although the insurance industry clearly exercises much less control 
over the NAIC’s operations than did the private farmers in the Boll Weavel 
case, their influence on the NAIC is different in kind than ordinary industry 
influence on state agencies. The NAIC’s open meeting policy has no parallel 
for government agencies, where the default assumption is that meetings 
among staff will be “closed” to the industry. This practice – coupled with the 
fact that so much of the NAIC’s work takes place through meetings 
conducted within the committee structure – ensures that the industry has a 
major voice in virtually every facet of the NAIC’s operations. So too does 
the fact that the NAIC’s conflict of interest policy is much weaker than 
almost any individual states, allowing in the most extreme cases for NAIC 
officers to switch within months from chairing an NAIC committee to 
representing industry interests before that committee. 
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B.    THE NAIC’S EXERCISE OF DELEGATED AUTHORITY IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO MEANINGFUL PUBLIC OVERSIGHT 
Unlike other private entities that are permissibly delegated legal 
authority by state legislatures, the NAIC’s exercise of delegated authority is 
not subject to meaningful oversight by either state judiciaries or 
administrative agencies.212 This point is straight-forward with respect to 
judicial oversight, as the NAIC’s decision-making is not judicially 
reviewable.213 But the lack of NAIC oversight by state insurance departments 
requires more explanation given the dominant role of state regulators in 
directing the organization and producing its work product.214 Subsection One 
first explains why state regulators’ direct role in producing the NAIC’s 
dynamically-incorporated materials does not constitute public oversight of 
the type that is relevant for purposes of states’ non-delegation doctrines. 
Subsection Two then suggests that individual state regulators’ capacity to 
depart from NAIC-drafted materials in specified circumstances also does not 
result in sufficient public oversight of the NAIC under non-delegation 
caselaw. 
1. State Regulators’ Direct Role in Developing NAIC 
Materials Does Not Constitute Public Oversight 
When legislatures delegate lawmaking authority to private 
organizations, they often task state agencies with monitoring and overseeing 
this exercise of authority.215 Public officials in these schemes do not directly 
control the private delegate’s decision making. Instead, they maintain their 
independence from the delegate to ensure that it is exercising its 
legislatively-delegated authority effectively, fairly, and efficiently. To 
illustrate, Congress authorized the SEC to sub-delegate authority over 
accounting rules to FASB.216 But FASB itself is comprised entirely of private 
individuals with accounting expertise, rather than any SEC officials.217 The 
role of the SEC in this scheme is to actively monitor how FASB exercises its 
delegated authority to ensure that its deliberations and determinations are not 
                                                 
212 See supra Section II.C.2. 
213 See supra Introduction. 
214 See supra Section I.C. 
215 See supra Section II.C.2. 
216 See supra Section II.D.2. 
217 See supra Section II.D.2. 
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unfairly biased or inadequately sensitive to relevant public policy 
concerns.218  
The NAIC turns this structure on its head. State insurance regulators 
do not independently oversee the NAIC’s exercise of authority. Instead, they 
directly exercise this authority through their participation in the NAIC’s 
internal processes.219 Thus, state insurance regulators acting under the 
auspices of the NAIC set the terms of the Valuation, AP&P, and ORSA 
manuals, relying only on private parties, like NAIC staff and industry, to 
advise them in this process rather than to exercise this authority directly.220 
By directly exercising the authority delegated to the NAIC, public officials 
produce rules with the force of law while avoiding any independent oversight 
whatsoever. State regulators’ exercise of the NAIC’s delegated authority is 
also exempt from any of the other constraints that ordinarily accompany 
officials’ public actions, such as laws governing conflicts of interest and 
transparency.221  
 This lack of independent oversight undermines the due process 
values that are at the heart of courts’ skepticism of private delegations.222 
Independent oversight of private delegates’ exercise of authority promotes 
due process for a variety of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it limits the 
risk of biased decision-making by private delegates, a concern that courts 
repeatedly emphasize in the caselaw examining the enhanced constitutional 
concerns associated with private delegations.223  
                                                 
218 See supra Section II.D.2. Similarly, the American Medical 
Association’s impairment standards ultimately are applied by state actors–
Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judges–who are not 
themselves AMA members. See also supra Section II.D.1. 
219 See supra Section I. 
220 See supra Section I. 
221 See supra Section I. 
222 See supra Section II.B. 
223 See supra Section II.B. Of course, other Due Process values are also 
served by independent oversight of a private delegate’s exercise of power. 
For instance, independent oversight helps ensure that rules with the force of 
law are evaluated from two independent perspectives, thus reducing the 
potential influence of group think or hidden biases. Just like a student cannot 
reliably grade her own work, state regulators cannot meaningfully oversee 
the production of materials that they themselves produce. 
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The risk that the NAIC will exhibit bias in exercising its delegated 
power is notable. State insurance regulators operating under the auspices of 
the NAIC may have substantial interests in using their delegated authority to 
expand the NAIC’s power and improve its finances. For instance, state 
insurance regulators may use the NAIC’s authority to inflate the scope and 
complexity of statutory accounting principles.224 Doing so can increase the 
value of regulators’ specialized insurance expertise, limit the risk of 
perceived encroachment on their turf by federal officials,225 and improve the 
NAIC’s capacity to fund its operations by selling updates AP&P manuals.226  
State regulators’ exercise of authority through the NAIC may be 
biased in other ways as well. For instance, state regulators can, and do, 
increasingly use the NAIC to raise, pursue, and implement difficult policies 
in a private forum, away from democratic accountability. By increasing the 
scope of issues that are regulated through NAIC manuals, rather than via 
ordinary administrative actions within individual insurance departments, 
state regulators can avoid the ordinary costs and difficulties associated with 
                                                 
224 There are good reasons to be skeptical that effective insurance 
regulation truly requires unique accounting principles as detailed and 
extensive as those found within statutory accounting. For an overview of 
how statutory accounting differs from GAAP, see Background on: Insurance 
Accounting, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/publications/insurance-
handbook/regulatory-and-financial-environment/background-on-insurance-
accounting (last visited, Oct. 8, 2018). 
225 For instance, insurance companies that are not publicly held only 
report their financial status using statutory accounting. However, many of 
the regulatory tools used by federal regulators are specifically designed for 
GAAP reporting. This fact has substantially complicated the Federal 
Reserve’s ability to regulate insurance-focused savings and loan holding 
companies. See generally Legislative Review of H.R. 5059, The State 
Insurance Regulation Preservation Act Before the U.S. H. of Reps. Comm. 
on Financial Servs. and the Subcomm. on Hous. & Ins., Insurance Summit 
(2018) (testimony of Daniel Schwarcz, Professor of Law, University of 
Minnesota Law School). 
226 As discussed above, the NAIC sells access to the AP&P manual to 
help fund its operations. See supra Section I. There is a good argument that 
the AP&P manual should not be protected by intellectual property laws given 
its status as state law. See Cunningham, supra note 34. 
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complying with their individual states’ administrative laws.227 For instance, 
rather than promulgating new regulations regarding group capital 
requirements – a controversial and complex topic228 – states can simply avoid 
any legal process by inserting new rules on this topic into the ORSA 
guidance manual.229 
Even if state regulators’ participation in the NAIC were somehow 
construed to constitute public oversight of the organization, this would still 
likely not satisfy state constitutional requirements. This is because, as noted 
above, the relevant perspective for purposes of evaluating non-delegation 
principles is that of an individual state, not states collectively.230 And from 
the perspective of any individual state, its public officials will generally play 
a minimal or non-existent role in exercising the NAIC’s authority. The 
NAIC’s individual committees are comprised of regulators from a variety of 
different states.231 As such, when those committees approve of changes to 
materials that are dynamically incorporated by reference, public officials 
from any single state will, at most, play only a limited role in producing or 
reviewing these materials. 
While laudable, the NAIC’s efforts to promote involvement of 
various stakeholders in its deliberations does not alter this analysis. Recall 
that the NAIC actively encourages industry and consumer stakeholder 
participation in its operations, both by maintaining a robust open meetings 
policy and by covering the costs of consumer-representatives to participate 
in its deliberations.232 But none of these efforts come close to constituting 
the type of oversight that constitutional principles generally demand for 
                                                 
227 Robert Williams coined the term “substance creep” to describe this 
phenomenon in a talk describing some of the potential risks associated with 
states’ dynamic incorporation-by-reference of NAIC materials. 
228 See Bilateral Agreement Between the United States of America and 
the European Union on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and 
Reinsurance, Sept. 22, 2017, E.U.-U.S., T.I.A.S. 18-404 [hereinafter 
Covered Agreement]. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 203. Recently, the 
United States agreed in a “covered agreement” with the E.U. The agreement 
creates an expectation that state insurance regulators will develop and 
implement a group capital “requirement or assessment.” 
229 See supra Section I.C.2. 
230 See supra Section III.A. 
231 See supra Section I. 
232 See supra Section I.A. 
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private delegations. The reason is simple: stakeholders who participate in the 
NAIC’s deliberations have no formal authority to vote on or otherwise 
directly influence the organization’s work product. Indeed, NAIC consumer 
representatives have complained public and privately for years that the NAIC 
merely pays lip service to consumer interests while generally doing little to 
promote real change.233 As such, their participation in the NAIC’s operations 
cannot coherently be considered oversight. 
Also, praiseworthy but irrelevant for purposes of constitutional 
analysis are the NAIC’s various internal procedures for publicly exposing 
working drafts and voting on changes to these materials. As discussed above, 
a private delegate’s voluntarily-adopted procedures for exercising its 
authority have nothing to do with the power that the legislature has delegated 
to that entity.234 Because compliance with these standards is not legally 
mandated, the NAIC can always change, or simply ignore, these internal 
rules with no consequence. 
2. State Insurance Departments’ Capacity to Depart from 
NAIC Manuals Does not Result in Meaningful 
Oversight of the NAIC 
The only plausible way that individual state insurance departments 
can be understood to exercise public oversight over the NAIC is through their 
authority to depart from dynamically-incorporated NAIC materials in 
specified circumstances. State insurance departments’ capacity to authorize 
such departures varies by topic and state. However, a common structure – 
                                                 
233 See, e.g., Comments of CFA and CEJ to Auto Insurance Working 
Group Regarding the August 10, 2018 Draft “Report” Outline, CONSUMER 
FED’N OF AM. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://consumerfed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/cfa-cej-comments-naicautowg.pdf. One notable 
exception is that the NAIC consumer liaison program seemingly had a large 
impact on the organization’s implementation of the Affordable Care Act. See 
Timothy Jost, Reflections on The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners and Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2011). 
234 Consumer Federation of America, supra note 204; Jost, supra note 
204; cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (“[B]eneficent 
aims, however great or well directed, can never serve in lieu of constitutional 
power.”). 
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reflected in both the Valuation and AP&P Manuals235 – is that individual 
state insurance departments can either promulgate regulations authorizing 
departures from specific provisions within dynamically-incorporated NAIC 
manuals for all insurers, or else they can permit such departures for 
individual insurers who apply for exemptions.236  
State Departments’ limited authority to depart from NAIC manuals 
is in some ways comparable to other types of public oversight of private 
delegations that Courts have found significant. For instance, as described 
earlier, one court tolerated a state’s prospective incorporation by reference 
of GAAP in part because aggrieved taxpayers could contest their tax liability 
before the state Comptroller.237 And a key element of the SEC’s oversight 
over FASB and other private delegates is its capacity to veto individual 
rules,238 an authority that is comparable to individual insurance departments’ 
authority to depart from portions of dynamically incorporated NAIC 
manuals.  
Notwithstanding these similarities, individual states’ capacity to 
depart from NAIC-produced material should not be deemed sufficient public 
oversight of the NAIC to stave off a non-delegation challenge. This is for 
two fundamental reasons. First, state insurance departments’ actual capacity 
to depart from NAIC materials is extremely limited as a practical matter. 
Second, individual states’ authority to depart from NAIC materials does not 
empower them to more broadly influence the NAIC’s exercise of its 
delegated authority.  
Consider first the practical limits on states’ capacity to depart from 
NAIC materials that are dynamically incorporated by reference into state 
law. Unlike other public overseers of private delegates, individual state 
insurance departments must promulgate regulations to reject rules contained 
within dynamically-incorporated NAIC materials.239 Doing so, of course, is 
time consuming, costly, and itself subject to judicial challenge. By contrast, 
states need merely do nothing to accept the NAIC’s exercise of delegated 
authority. This scheme inhibits state insurance departments’ oversight of the 
                                                 
235 See supra Section I.C. 
236 In the statutory accounting context, the former are referred to as 
prescribed practices, whereas the latter are referred to as permitted practices.  
237 See supra Section II.D.2 (describing Cent. Power & Light Co. v. 
Sharp, 919 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App. 1996)). 
238 See supra Section II.D.2. 
239 See supra Section I.C.  
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NAIC by making it both costly and difficult. Consistent with this fact, state 
insurance departments almost never promulgate rules departing from 
dynamically incorporated NAIC materials. 
To be sure, states are empowered to authorize specific departures 
from NAIC rules for individual insurers without promulgating regulations.240 
But this power to grant individual exemptions to insurers cannot be 
understood to constitute oversight of the NAIC’s delegated power. Instead, 
it simply allows insurance departments to recognize individual instances 
where the NAIC’s rules may not be appropriate.241 Moreover, this type of 
individualized exercise of discretion requires insurers to affirmatively 
request an exemption; it is not a necessary incident of the NAIC’s exercise 
of delegated power. By contrast, courts that have authorized workers’ 
compensation statues that dynamically incorporate AMA impairment 
standards have emphasized that administrative law judges must apply these 
standards using their discretion in order for them to have the force of law.242  
States’ capacity to meaningfully exercise their authority to depart 
from dynamically incorporated NAIC materials is also limited by the sheer 
scope of these materials. As described above, states delegate an immense 
array of different authorities to the NAIC, encompassing not just the rules 
governing accounting, reserving, and corporate governance, but also a wide 
range of additional topics.243 In many ways, the NAIC essentially controls 
all aspects of financial regulation of U.S. insurers: The entire accounting 
system comes from NAIC in the AP&P Manual, and the entire method of 
analyzing and examining insurers’ finances and governance is found in the 
Financial Condition Examiners Handbook and Financial Analysis 
Handbook. 244 States simply do not have the practical bandwidth to 
                                                 
240 See supra Section I.C. 
241 See supra Section I.C. 
242 See supra Section II.D.1.  
243 See supra Section I. 
244 There is nothing discrete about NAIC’s involvement in setting 
regulatory policy. Instead, by design, the NAIC has since 1990 attempted to 
“establish a national system of uniform insurance regulation” with itself at 
the center. Today, that goal is described in the current “About the NAIC” 
tagline used in all its official statements, which concludes with the 
description that “NAIC members, together with the central resources of the 
NAIC, form the national system of state-based insurance regulation in the 
U.S.” See, About the NAIC, supra note 15. 
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meaningfully monitor the NAIC’s actions across all of these domains.245 
Perhaps reflecting this difficulty of effectively monitoring expansive 
delegations of power to private actors, at least one court has suggested that 
the scope of a state’s delegation of power to a private entity is itself relevant 
to whether it is constitutionally permissible.246  
Apart from these practical limits on state insurance departments’ 
capacity to depart from dynamically incorporated NAIC materials, any such 
departures do not, in fact, operate as a form of oversight over the NAIC. The 
mere fact that one or even several states exercise their authority to depart 
from NAIC-produced materials does not empower those states to influence 
the NAIC more broadly. Even in such cases, the NAIC’s manuals have the 
force of law in the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions. The upshot of this 
reality is that, unlike other public watchdogs of private parties who are 
delegated authority, states have limited capacity to transform their veto 
authority into soft power that can influence the NAIC’s actions. Compare, 
for instance, the power that an individual state wields vis a vis the NAIC 
relative to the SEC’s veto power over FASB. As noted above, the SEC 
doesn’t need to use its veto authority in order for it to dramatically influence 
FASB’s decision-making, because the veto threat is typically enough.247 No 
individual state can similarly transform whatever veto authority it has into a 
broader capacity to oversee the NAIC’s operations. 
C. THE NAIC’S EXERCISE OF DELEGATED AUTHORITY IS NOT 
INDEPENDENT FROM THE DELEGATING STATUE 
Even state statutes that dynamically incorporate by reference 
materials that are produced by private organizations without any meaningful 
public oversight may not violate Constitutional non-delegation principles. At 
least some courts have approved of such legislative delegations when the 
                                                 
245 See Improving U.S. Insurance Regulation, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. 
26, 28 (Apr. 2017), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04 
/Improving-U.S.-Insurance-Regulation.pdf (noting that many state insurance 
departments have too few resources to effectively regulate their markets). 
246 See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 
S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997), as supplemented on denial of reh'g (Oct. 9, 1997). 
247 See supra Section II.D.1; William W. Bratton, Private Standards, 
Public Governance: A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5 (2007). 
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private organization is an independent, expert body, as illustrated by the 
conflicting caselaw on workers’ compensation statutes that dynamically 
incorporate by reference impairment standards produced by the American 
Medical Association.248 At first blush, states’ prospective incorporation-by-
reference of the NAIC’s materials may seem defensible under this precedent; 
the NAIC undoubtedly possesses a massive amount of insurance expertise, 
both among its direct employees and as a result of its network of state 
insurance regulators.249  
But unlike any of these cases where courts have approved of 
prospective statutory incorporation by reference of a private expert body’s 
standards, the NAIC’s production of these standards is not independent of 
the law-making process. To the contrary, the entire purpose of the NAIC’s 
production of dynamically-incorporated materials is to set the terms by 
which state insurance regulation operates. Unlike, for instance, the AMA’s 
impairment standards – which can help medical professionals perform their 
professional obligations for reasons having nothing to do with workers’ 
compensation – the materials contained in the various dynamically-
incorporated NAIC materials have no independent purpose aside from state 
insurance regulation. To illustrate, statutory accounting principles require 
different accounting standards than GAAP ostensibly to facilitate regulators’ 
capacity to assess whether an insurer will be able to pay its future claims.250 
Similarly, the NAIC’s valuation manual exist solely to ensure that carriers 
meet regulatory expectations in setting aside appropriate funds to pay future 
claims.251 
Not only are the NAIC’s dynamically incorporated materials created 
for the express purpose of binding insurers and insurance regulators, but the 
NAIC actively pressures states to adopt these standards through its 
accreditation program. The pressure that the NAIC’s accreditation program 
places on states to delegate authority to the NAIC is described in detail in 
Part I.252 The key point here, though, is that this type of pressure directly 
undermines any plausible claim that the NAIC’s dynamically-incorporated 
materials are produced from some reason independent of their legal 
authority. It is one thing for a private organization to exercise delegated 
authority for the sole purpose of influencing legal rules. But independence is 
                                                 
248 See supra Section II.D.1.  
249 See supra Section I. 
250 See supra Section I.B. 
251 See supra Section I.B. 
252 See supra Section I.  
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even more lacking when an organization like the NAIC exercises this power 
only after actively pressuring states to delegate this authority to them.  
In fact, the NAIC’s accreditation program strikes at the heart of the 
constitutional concerns that motivate states’ non-delegation doctrines by 
undermining state legislatures’ practical ability to claw back power from the 
NAIC.253 Simply put, the NAIC faces no practical risk that state legislatures 
will limit its authority when it uses that authority to further inflate its 
prominence in state insurance regulation, enhance its revenue, and allow 
state regulators to fundamentally alter state insurance law without any 
legally-mediated public accountability. At the end of the day, no state can 
make a realistic threat that it will reverse its delegation of authority to the 
NAIC, because doing so would trigger significant tax and employment 
repercussions for the state. Rather than legislatures delegating authority to 
the NAIC, the NAIC has – in a quite real sense – successfully constructed a 
scheme where it delegates to itself the authority to shape insurance regulation 
as it sees fit, with no public accountability or legally-mandated process.  
Ultimately, a substantial portion of U.S. insurance regulation rests 
on a constitutionally-shaky foundation. As a private entity that is not 
controlled by state legislatures and unaccountable to any independent public 
authority, the NAIC’s direct exercise of delegated power violates core 
principles of every states’ constitutions. The question, of course, becomes 
what should states do about this problem. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF U.S. INSURANCE 
REGULATION 
Recognizing the unconstitutional foundations of U.S. insurance 
regulation would complicate the capacity of states to effectively regulate 
insurers. But it would not undermine states’ insurance regulation writ large. 
This Part explains that conclusion. First, Part A briefly considers both the 
positive and negative impacts of simply eliminating state delegations of 
power to the NAIC. Although this approach would increase accountability 
and decrease bias in the production of state insurance regulation, it would 
also undermine the uniformity and agility of such regulation. For this reason, 
Part B suggests one approach to preserving states’ reliance on the NAIC 
while instituting safeguards that would ensure constitutional protections: 
creating an interstate insurance compact that would be staffed by 
                                                 
253 See supra Section II.C. 
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independent experts in insurance regulation and responsible for reviewing 
the production of new NAIC materials that have the force of law. 
A.    THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING STATES’ DYNAMIC 
CROSS REFERENCES TO NAIC MATERIALS 
The unconstitutional structure of state insurance regulation is easily 
remediable. State insurance laws could simply be revised – either directly by 
state legislatures, or judicially, by courts severing the unconstitutional 
portions of these laws – so that they only cross-referenced versions of NAIC 
materials that were finalized before those state laws were enacted.254 This 
would mean that NAIC changes to statutorily cross-referenced materials 
would only have the force of law to the extent that state legislators, after 
having a chance to review these changes, approved of these materials.255 
State legislatures wishing to delegate this review process to their state 
insurance departments could easily do so by directly empowering them to 
adopt via regulation updated versions of cross-referenced NAIC materials. 
These reforms would increase the NAIC’s accountability and 
transfer power back to states, where it rightly resides under the current US 
insurance regulatory framework. In doing so, these reforms could have a 
substantial impact on the substance of the materials the NAIC adopted in its 
various manuals. Controversial changes would likely prompt much closer 
legislative or regulatory scrutiny which, in turn, would have a disciplining 
effect on what the NAIC chose to include in these materials, leading it to shy 
away from shoe-horning controversial or substantive provisions into its 
manuals and guides. This reform would also assure impacted parties of the 
opportunity to challenge any elements of the NAIC-produced materials that 
they objected to through the ordinary safeguards built into state legislative 
or regulatory processes. 
                                                 
254 See supra section II.B (discussing the fact that non-prospective cross-
references are not delegations of power, but simply legislative short-hand).  
255 In most cases, states could presumably will to do this through 
omnibus legislation that would be adopted without serious controversy or 
debate. For this approach to work, the NAIC would be forced to revise its 
accreditation program standards to clarify that updated NAIC-produced 
manuals, guides, and the like need only be adopted by states after a 
reasonable period of time for review and evaluation of those materials by 
state legislators.  
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At the same time, this approach could have significant drawbacks by 
undermining the uniformity and agility of state insurance regulation. A 
substantial benefit of the NAIC’s dynamic incorporation by reference 
approach is that it allows state insurance regulation to quickly and uniformly 
respond to emerging regulatory issues. Moreover, states’ lack of uniform 
insurance regulation has proven to be a substantial problem in a variety of 
settings. Such inconsistencies increase the costs of compliance for 
insurers,256 create the prospect of regulatory arbitrage,257 and potentially 
undermine the effectiveness of state insurance regulation.258 For these 
reasons, it is worthwhile to consider whether reforms to the structure of state 
insurance law and regulation could simultaneously preserve the NAIC’s role 
in drafting dynamically-incorporated materials for state law while limiting 
the constitutional infirmities of this approach. 
B.    A PROPOSED INTERSTATE COMPACT TO ESTABLISH 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE NAIC'S EXERCISE OF 
DELEGATED AUTHORITY 
Eliminating state delegations of power to the NAIC would clearly 
have both costs and benefits. But there is a potential way for state legislatures 
to avoid this tradeoff by constitutionally delegating power to the NAIC. In 
particular, they could create, through an interstate compact, an independent 
public entity that would be tasked with reviewing the NAIC’s exercise of 
delegated authority. 
As discussed above, state delegations of power to private entities are 
generally constitutionally permissible if they are subject to independent 
oversight by state courts or agencies.259 But simply applying this approach 
to the NAIC could create substantial practical problems if the NAIC’s 
revisions of dynamically incorporated materials were independently 
reviewed in each state, then many of the benefits of consolidating the 
                                                 
256 See MARTIN F. GRACE & ROBERT W. KLEIN, THE FUTURE OF 
INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13–51, 117–43 
(Brookings Inst. & Geor. State Univ. eds., 2009). 
257 See FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND 
IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2013).  
258 Id. 
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production of these standards at the NAIC might be lost. The rules of state 
insurance regulation contained in dynamically incorporated materials could 
be rejected or revised by individual states, potentially leading to the same 
patchwork of rules that motivated creation of the NAIC accreditation 
program in the first place. 260  
An interstate compact could allow states to avoid these practical 
problems while simultaneously assuring that their delegations of power to 
the NAIC are constitutionally compliant. In particular, states could use an 
interstate compact to create a new multistate public entity whose sole 
responsibility would be to independently review the NAIC’s exercise of 
delegated authority. In this sense, the new entity’s role would resemble the 
SEC’s oversight of FASB or even state courts’ oversight of state agencies 
under basic administrative law principles. Thus, the new entity created by 
interstate compact could focus on assessing whether the NAIC’s production 
of materials that have the force of law adhered to various procedural and 
substantive constraints. Such review, as in both ordinary administrative law 
and the SEC’s oversight of FASB, would presumably be deferential in 
recognition of the NAIC’s expertise.261 Subjecting the NAIC’s exercise of 
delegated authority to review by an independent, multistate entity created by 
interstate compact would almost certainly solve the constitutional problems 
embedded within the current U.S. insurance regulatory framework. As 
discussed at length above, oversight by an independent, public entity is 
usually sufficient to insulate delegations of power to a private entity from 
constitutional scrutiny.262 Meanwhile, there is little doubt that state 
legislatures could constitutionally delegate oversight of the NAIC to a new 
multistate entity that they created by interstate compact, rather than to their 
own state courts or agencies. It is well established that state legislatures can, 
via interstate compact, constitutionally create a multistate public agency to 
formulate regulatory standards.263 It seemingly follows that states could also 
constitutionally empower such a multistate entity with responsibility for 
scrutinizing a private delegate’s development of regulatory standards.264 
                                                 
260 See supra Section I.B. 
261 See supra Section II.D.1. 
262 See supra Section II.C (explaining that delegations to private actors 
are generally constitutionally if the private actor’s exercise of authority is 
subject to independent, public scrutiny).  
263 See Amica v. Wertz, Civil Action No. 15-cv-1161-WJM-CBS (2018).  
264 To be sure, this proposal is still subject to the concern – invoked above 
with respect to the NAIC – that public officials from one state are not 
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This proposed approach would not only meet state constitutional 
requirements, but it would preserve the practical benefits associated with 
consolidating the production of financial regulatory standards within the 
NAIC. The NAIC would continue to be in charge of updating materials that 
are dynamically incorporated by reference in state law, thus avoiding any 
substantial disruption in the mechanics of state insurance regulation. For 
similar reasons, the proposed approach would also continue to take 
advantage of the NAIC’s expertise and knowledge in producing the detailed 
rules of insurance regulation.  
Using an interstate compact to create a new multistate entity with a 
role in insurance regulation is not without precedent. To the contrary, in 2004 
participating states created an Interstate Insurance Product Regulation 
Commission (IIPRC) as “a joint public agency.” The IIPRC began operating 
in 2006 and, as of September 2014, 44 states had enacted legislation agreeing 
to the Compact, representing over 70% of national premium volume.265 
Consistent with its public status, the IIPRC is legally required to adhere to a 
number of procedural requirements. For instance, it must follow “a 
rulemaking process that conforms to the Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1981” and provide advance written notice of its intent to 
adopt new standards.266 Similarly, any standards it promulgates can be 
judicially challenged in much the same manner as ordinary regulations.267  
The key difference between the proposal here and the IIPRC is that 
the new multistate public entity proposed here would be responsible for 
overseeing the NAIC’s production of regulatory rules with the force of law, 
rather than creating those rules itself. As such, it would need to be structured 
                                                 
politically accountable to the populations of other states. But this criticism 
would be muted in the context of a public entity that was affirmatively 
created by state legislatures to ensure that the NAIC’s exercise of delegated 
authority was itself reasonable.  
265 The IIPRC reviews policy forms based on uniform rules that it 
promulgates in coordination with the NAIC. IIPRC product rules are initially 
devised by NAIC and IIPRC committees and subjected to a sixty-day public 
comment period. To be adopted, they must be approved by 2/3 of the IIPRC 
management committee, made up of 15 member states representing a cross-
section of states, and then 2/3 of all member states. See ABRAHAM & 
SCHWARCZ, supra note 2; Elizabeth F. Brown, Will the Federal Insurance 
Office Improve Insurance Regulation?, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 563 (2012). 
266 Amica v. Wertz, Civil Action No. 15-cv-1161-WJM-CBS. 
267 Id. 
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differently from the IIPRC. Perhaps most importantly, unlike the IIPRC, the 
proposed multistate entity would need to be independent of the NAIC and 
state insurance regulators. Consistent with the entity’s adjudicative role, this 
could be accomplished by staffing it with a rotating panel of state appellate 
judges. 
An alternative approach to remedying the unconstitutional structure 
of state insurance regulation would be to entirely relocate the production of 
materials that have the force of law from the NAIC to the newly-created 
multistate entity. This proposal – which would hew closely to the IIPRC 
approach – would more directly solve the constitutional infirmities of the 
present state insurance regulatory system by shifting states’ delegations of 
power to a public multistate entity, rather than by subjecting the NAIC’s 
exercise of delegated authority to oversight by that entity. As such, its 
structure could directly mirror the IIPRC, both with respect to applicable 
procedural requirements and membership. The most significant drawback of 
this approach is that it could substantially disrupt the current processes for 
producing materials that are dynamically incorporated by reference in state 
law. 
But whatever the details, creating a new single, publicly-
accountable, entity to play a role in overseeing or producing uniform 
regulatory standards represents one promising approach to addressing the 
unconstitutionality of the present state-based regulatory scheme while 
preserving most of its benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite ubiquitous rhetoric emphasizing the primacy of states in 
insurance regulation, the NAIC in many ways operates as a national regulator 
of the business of insurance. But unlike any other regulator, the NAIC is 
completely unaccountable to legislatures or judicial officers, either at the 
state or federal level. The NAIC’s accreditation program further undermines 
its accountability, allowing it to effectively compel states to preserve and 
expand its delegated authority. This unconstitutional structure has allowed 
the NAIC to broaden its power, size, and reach, in ways that often have 
dubious social value. It is now time for states to take back their power from 
rogue state insurance regulators by holding the NAIC accountable. Doing so 
need not undermine the structure of state insurance regulation. By using the 
interstate compact process to create a public entity that would review the 
NAIC’s actions that have the force of law, states can reign in the NAIC’s 
excessive power while preserving the capacity of state insurance regulation 
to produce uniform and agile standards. 
